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Essays on work and fertility 
 
Jenni Kellokumpu    
 
Abstract  
This dissertation consists of four empirical essays all related to children and 
parents' labor supply, earnings and income in Finland. In the essays the problem 
of unobserved heterogeneity has been attacked in various ways. In the first essay, 
identical adult twins are used to estimate the impact of children on lifetime 
earnings and income. Identical twins share not only the same family but the same 
genes, hence such unobserved factors as family background and innate ability 
can be controlled for in the estimation. This is the closest possible similarity 
between two persons. The results suggest that both mothers and fathers have 
around 30 to 40% higher lifetime earnings compared to childless women and 
men even after controlling for family background and innate ability. The positive 
and large effect on mothers' earnings is a surprising result and against previous 
empirical evidence – though the focus of earlier research has typically been on 
the immediate years following childbirth. Although there are several potential 
explanations for such a large effect, the size of the found effect is surprisingly 
great.    
The second essay studies the effect of income on fertility by using job loss due to 
a plant closure as a source of exogenous variation in household income. Unlike 
previous studies, this essay focuses on couples and the impact of joint family 
income on fertility. The results show that the woman's job loss has a negative 
effect on fertility, while the man's has no impact on fertility. This suggests that 
the income effect is not the main mechanism through which job loss influences 
couples’ fertility behavior. Career concerns, especially in the case of highly 
educated women, seem to be a much more important determinant. The result is 
similar to the one found in a previous study of the effects of female job loss.    
The third essay exploits the exogenous variation in family size, caused by the 
families' preference to have both boys and girls, to study the impact of children 
on parents' labor supply and income. The results suggest that another child has a 
sizeable negative impact on the maternal employment of cohabiting and married 
mothers, while there is no effect on the labor supply of single mothers. The labor 
supply response of Finnish mothers is much larger than found in the previous 
empirical studies in the US, the UK and Sweden using the same identification 
strategy. However, the relatively large maternal labor supply effects are in line 
with the earlier Finnish research. I find that another child has no impact on labor 
supply of fathers.  
In the fourth essay, the wages after maternity and paternity leaves are studied. 
However, in this essay the chosen method is less suitable in tackling the 
unobserved heterogeneity: being unmarried in the 1995 is a poor predictor of 
being childless: If one is not married in the 1995 no longer necessarily means one 
is without children in the years 2001 and 2002. In this essay, a maternity leave is 
associated with a reduction in wage after returning to employment. However, this 
association seems to be only short-lived. A paternity leave has no or only a small 
positive effect on wages. 
Key words: children, earnings, income, labor supply, unobserved heterogeneity 
 
Esseitä työstä ja syntyvyydestä 
 
Jenni Kellokumpu    
 
Tiivistelmä                                                             
Väitöskirjassa on neljä empiiristä esseetä, joissa käsitellään lapsia ja vanhempien 
työn tarjontaa, ansiota ja tuloja Suomessa. Havaitsematon erilaisuus lapsettomien 
ja perheellisten välillä on otettu huomioon näissä esseissä eri tavoin. 
Ensimmäisessä esseessä lasten vaikutus elinkaariansioihin ja -tuloihin arvioidaan 
identtisillä kaksosilla. Identtiset kaksoset eivät ainoastaan jaa samaa perhettä, 
vaan myös samat geenit, jolloin sellaiset havaitsemattomat, tuloihin vaikuttavat 
tekijät, kuten perhetausta ja synnynnäinen kyvykkyys, voidaan kontrolloida 
estimoinneissa. Tulosten mukaan äidit ja isät ansaitsevat elinaikanansa 
keskimäärin 30 %–40 % enemmän kuin lapsettomat naiset ja miehet. Lasten 
positiivinen ja suuri vaikutus äitien ansioihin on yllättävää ja vastoin aiempaa 
empiiristä näyttöä – tosin aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on yleensä arvioitu lasten 
vaikutusta ansioihin ainoastaan lasten syntymää seuraavina lähivuosina. Vaikka 
näin suurelle vaikutukselle on useita mahdollisia selityksiä, vaikutuksen suuruus 
on siitä huolimatta yllättävää. 
Toisessa esseessä tutkitaan tulojen vaikutusta syntyvyyteen hyödyntämällä 
kotitalouksien tulojen satunnaista vaihtelua, mikä aiheutuu työpaikan 
menetyksestä, kun toimipaikka lakkautetaan. Toisin kuin aiemmat tutkimukset, 
tässä tutkimuksessa keskitytään pariskuntiin ja kotitalouden tulojen vaikutukseen 
syntyvyyteen. Tulokset osoittavat, että naisen oman työpaikan menetys vähentää 
syntyvyyttä, mutta miehen ei. Tämä tulos viittaa siihen, että tulot eivät ole 
päätekijä lastenhankintapäätöksissä. Sen sijaan erilaisilla naisen uraan ja 
työllistymiseen liittyvillä näkökohdilla voi olla vaikutusta – erityisesti korkeasti 
koulutetuilla naisilla. Tulos on samanlainen kuin aiemmassa kirjallisuudessa 
naisen työpaikan menetyksen vaikutuksesta syntyvyyteen. 
Kolmannessa esseessä hyödynnetään perhekoon satunnaista vaihtelua, mikä 
johtuu vanhempien preferensseistä saada sekä tyttöjä että poikia: ne perheet, 
joissa kaksi ensimmäistä lasta ovat samaa sukupuolta, todennäköisemmin 
hankkivat vielä yhden lapsen kuin vanhemmat, joiden kaksi ensimmäistä lasta 
ovat eri sukupuolta. Tulosten mukaan yksi lisälapsi vähentää merkittävästi äitien 
työn tarjontaa muilla paitsi yksinhuoltajaäideillä. Suomessa lasten lukumäärän 
vaikutus äitien työntarjontaan on paljon suurempi kuin mitä on havaittu 
aiemmissa tutkimuksissa Yhdysvalloista, Isosta-Britanniasta ja Ruotsista samaa 
tutkimusmenetelmää käyttäen. Tulokset ovat kuitenkin yhdenmukaisia verrattuna 
aiempaan suomalaiseen tutkimustietoon. Isien työn tarjontaan lasten määrällä ei 
tulosten perusteella ole vaikutusta. 
Neljännessä esseessä tutkitaan perhevapaan vaikutusta sen jälkeisiin äidin ja isän 
palkkoihin. Tämän esseen tutkimusasetelma on aineistosta johtuen selvästi 
heikompi kuin väitöskirjan muissa esseissä käytetyt menetelmät. Tämä johtuu 
siitä, että tiedolla, onko henkilö naimisissa vuonna 1995 vai ei, voidaan hyvin 
heikosti ennustaa sitä, onko hän lapseton 2000-luvun alussa. Tutkimuksessa 
äitiysvapaan ja sen jälkeisen palkan välillä havaitaan negatiivinen yhteys, joka 
tosin on vain väliaikainen. Isyysvapaalla ja sen jälkeisellä palkalla on 
korkeintaan heikko positiivinen yhteys. 
Asiasanat: lapset, ansiot, tulot, työn tarjonta, havaitsematon erilaisuus 
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1. Introduction 
The question of how income affects fertility decisions and how these decisions, 
on the other hand, affect income is of major policy relevance. The commonly 
held view is that children are one explanation to the weaker labor market position 
of women relative to men. Many countries implement new policies to enable 
women to have children in addition to a successful career. Moreover, fathers are 
encouraged to take more responsibility for the care of children by policies 
targeted especially to fathers.   
What is the causal interpretation behind the well documented negative 
relationship between children and female wages (e.g. Gronau, 1988, Korenman 
and Neumark 1992, Waldfogel 1997, 1998)? Do children have a negative effect 
on female wages or is it rather so that women with lower wages tend to have 
more children? The challenge in empirical work on fertility and wages is to 
identify the causal effect of children to wages. Mothers and childless women may 
differ from each other in ways, which cannot be observed from the data on 
earnings and family size – such as ability, motivation, ambition and career 
orientedness, which are both positively correlated with wages and negatively 
correlated with the desire for children. Hence, the observed negative correlation 
between children and female wages is rather caused by this unobserved 
heterogeneity than children. To rephrase, it may be that mothers would earn even 
less in the absence of children. Another reason for the possible selection of low-
wage women into motherhood is that the wage is a component of the cost of 
children. This might make low-wage women more likely to become mothers.   
Similarly, it is unclear to what extent the documented positive association 
between male earnings and marriage is causal (Korenman and Neumark 1991, 
Gray 1997)? The “marriage premium” can be explained by a positive selection 
into marriage: those men who succeed in the labor market are often the same men 
who succeed in the marriage market. Alternatively, the premium can be a 
reflection of a true improvement in productivity: if the wife allocates her time 
more to housework and children, the husband can specialize in market work.  
The past empirical work has solved the endogeneity of fertility and unobserved 
heterogeneity by using a natural experiment, a policy reform or fixed-effects 
estimator. The birth of twins is probably the most well-known example of a 
natural experiment used to study the impact of children on labor market 
outcomes pioneered by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and followed by many 
others (e.g. Bronars and Grogger 1994, Gangadharan and Rosenbloom, 1996, 
Jacobsen et al. 1999, Vere 2011). Since giving birth to twins is random, twinning 
causes an unexpected increase in family size. Hence data on the birth of twins 
and parents' labor market outcomes is close to experimental data. Alternatively, 
twins have been used to study the impact of schooling on various outcomes 
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beginning from Ashenfelter’s and Krueger’s (1994) famous twin study of the 
effect of schooling on earnings. Adult twins are also employed in studies 
concerning the effect of schooling on assortative mating and fertility (see e.g. 
Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, Kohler et al. 2010). A recent study of Amin and 
Behrman (2014) use identical twins to estimate the impact of schooling on the 
timing of fertility. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect which children have on their 
parents’ income has not been investigated by using data on identical twins.    
Another example of a natural experiment is the documented western families' 
preference to have both a son and a daughter (see e.g. Westoff et al. 1963, 
Williamson 1976). Angrist and Evans (1998) were the first ones to use this 
preference to study the inference between fertility and the labor market outcomes 
of parents in the US in 1980 and 1990. In their study they exploit the parents' 
preference to a sibling sex mix (and also the birth of twins at second birth) when 
estimating the causal effect of children on the parents’ labor supply. Other 
studies using families’ preference for a sibling sex mix to study maternal 
employment in western countries include Iacovou (2001) for the UK, Daouli, 
Demoussis and Giannakopoulus (2009) for Greece, and Hirvonen (2010) for 
Sweden. A preference for sons in the Asian countries has been used in studies of 
maternal labor supply in Korea (Chun and Oh 2002) and in Taiwan (Ebenstein 
2007).  
Typically, these studies find a negative effect of children on maternal 
employment and no effect on the fathers' labor supply.    
Job displacement due to a plant closure is also one example of a natural 
experiment. Such displacement creates potentially exogenous variation in 
household income and hence enables to analyse the causal effect of income on 
the number of children in the family. There are only a few studies, which have 
used exogenous variation in income due to job loss to identify the effect of 
income on fertility. While Lindo (2010) and Amialchuk (2011) focus on man's 
job loss in the US, Del Bono, Weber and Winter-Ebmer (2012) use woman's job 
loss in Austria. All of these studies find a negative effect of job displacement on 
fertility, but the interpretation of the effect differs. Del Bono, Weber and Winter-
Ebmer (2012) conclude that the possible mechanism is not the income effect, but 
the difficulties women face in re-establishing their careers after job loss.   
There is also abundant literature on the effect of family policies on fertility and 
employment. In Canada (Milligan 2005) and in France (Laroque and Salanié 
2013) a strong effect of financial incentives on fertility has been found. The 
reduction in child-care prices in Sweden had no effect on employment (Lundin et 
al. 2008), while in Canada (Baker et al. 2008, Lefebre and Merrigan 2008) there 
was a positive effect on employment. The availability of school slots for two-
year-old children had a positive impact on the employment of single mothers in 
France (Goux and Maurin 2010). Ruhm's (1998) cross-country comparison finds 
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a positive association between the maternity leave and female employment. A 
study on the effect of an extension of parental leave in Austria finds a negative 
impact on employment (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009). The results also suggest 
that both cash transfers and job protection are important for employment 
decisions. Also Baker and Milligan (2008) find that long expansions in job-
protected leave result in reductions in maternal employment in Canada. 
Similarly, the policy of job-protected child home care leave has a large negative 
impact on maternal employment in Finland (Kosonen 2011).   
There are a number of studies which use panel data and fixed-effects estimators 
to control for time-invariant unobservables that affect both family and labor 
market outcomes: Korenman and Neumark (1992), Waldfogel (1997), Lundberg 
and Rose (2000) all use US panel data. Their findings suggest that there is a 
negative selection into parenthood: parents earn less than non-parents even 
before the birth of the first child. While Korenman and Neumark find the 
motherhood wage gap to be solely due to this unobserved heterogeneity, the 
fixed-effects estimates of Waldfogel (1997), and Lundberg and Rose (2000) 
confirm that the motherhood wage penalty exists even after controlling for the 
unonbserved differences.  
Although, in Lundberg and Rose this is true only for mothers who experience a 
career break. Similarly, Napari (2010) have found that there is a motherhood 
wage penalty for Finnish mothers – especially for mothers who spend more time 
out of the labor market. Lundberg and Rose (2002) also showed that becoming a 
father increases the hourly wage and also working hours of US men. Hyung-Jai 
et al. (2008) have found similar results in men living in Western Germany.  
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seems to be only short-lived. A paternity leave has no or only a small positive 
effect on wages.    
The results of this thesis should be interpreted in the context of the Finnish 
society – a high fertility/high female employment economy. Finland has a 
decades-long history in policies, which are targeted to improve the labor market 
participation of both parents, particularly of mothers. The rapid expansion of the 
Finnish welfare state started in the 1970s and continued through the 1980s until 
the deep recession of the early 1990s. The construction of the welfare state 
enabled women to participate in the labor market by offering maternity leaves 
and a public day care for children. At the same time, the welfare state needed 
female labor force: the comprehensive school reform introduced a uniform nine-
year comprehensive school in 1972, the Primary Health Care Act introduced 
centers for primary care in the same year and the Child Care Act of 1973 
increased the number of child day care places radically. Health and social 
services, and education all became female-dominated occupations.  
At the same time when new opportunities for labor market work for women 
arose, so did the need for policies to help mothers and fathers to combine work 
and family. In 1970 employees got the right for a short absence from work to 
care for a sick child. In 1974 the maternity leave was extended from 3 to 7 
months. In 1978 a short paternity leave of 12 days was introduced (however, the 
father's use of these days reduced the mother's days correspondingly). In 1980 
the maternity leave was extended further and a new parental leave was 
introduced. In 1984 a public day care for children under 3 years was guaranteed. 
In 1990 the job-protected child home-care leave for children under 3 years was 
introduced by the support of the Home Care Allowance. Since 1990 the reforms 
in family policies are targeted mainly to fathers to promote gender-equality both 
in the labor market and in the care of children: a new paternity leave of 6 days in 
1991, an extension of paternity leave to 18 days in 1993, an extra “daddy month” 
in 2003. Despite this, the fathers' rights still remained fairly modest compared to 
the rights of mothers.   
In the first essay, the children in the target group were born between 1971 and 
1989 – a time period in which the construction of the Finnish welfare state took 
place and a series of new family policies were introduced. Hence, the large 
positive motherhood premium in lifetime earnings might be due to better labor 
market opportunities for women and family policies which enabled establishing 
both a professional career and family. The second essay studies the effect of a 
sudden and very deep recession of the early 1990s on couples' fertility decisions 
in Finland – in particular, the effect of a job loss due to a plant closure on 
fertility. The third essay analyses the labor supply of women (and of their 
spouses) who became parents during the 1990s and early 2000s. In this time 
period a unique family policy even among the Nordic countries, a job-protected 
home care leave up to three years per child, gained popularity among Finnish 
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The results suggest that being a parent has a positive and economically large 
impact on lifetime earnings and income around 30 to 40% of both males and 
females. The economically sizeable effect is a somewhat surprising finding – 
particularly concerning mothers. Typically, previous studies have found a 
negative effect of children on female earnings. However, the focus of previous 
studies has been on the earnings around the childbirth, not on the lifetime 
earnings as in this study. The found increase in fathers' earnings in earlier 
research is typically more modest, around 10 to 20%. There are numerous 
possible explanations for such a large effect. First, the child premium might 
reflect some form of selection – even within a twin pair. Those without children 
may be a negatively selected group of individuals. In other words, they may be 
persons who have experienced an individual specific shock – for example a 
health shock – in their lives, which prevents them from making both children and 
money. Equally, having a child can be a positive “shock” to one's health. Second, 
it might be that having a child actually improves productivity – whether it is due 
to the parenthood changing one’s personality or one’s use of time. Third, having 
a family could be a signal from a responsibility, commitment, prestige, etc. – 
things that are valued by the employer. Fourth, becoming a parent sets demands 
on the family economy – for example a larger house is often needed – which in 
turn is reflected in one's labor market choices and performance. Becoming a 
parent might also change the preferences on lifestyle – for example, a larger 
house is often preferred, if not needed. Last, a child premium may be explained 
by the so-called in-group bias, meaning that people have a tendency to favor their 
own kind and are more altruistic within their group. When considering the 
cohorts of this study, for individuals born between 1944 and 1950, being a parent 
has been the social norm. One explanation could also be institutional. In some 
manufacturing industries the employee contracts require that when employers 
need to lay off workers for reasons related to production, they first have to lay off 
workers with the least tenure and no children. These industries are male-
dominated, which might explain the high “father premium” after the deep 
recession in the early 1990s. The study of the channels of this “parent premium” 
is left for future work.   
2.2.2 The Effect of Job Displacement on Couples' Fertility Decisions   
The second essay analyses the effects of a job loss due to a plant closure on 
fertility. Because job displacement should be an exogenous shock to a worker’s 
career, we can disentangle the causal effect of income changes on the fertility 
behavior of couples. In the analysis, we use Finnish longitudinal employer-
employee data (FLEED) matched to birth records. The data consist of all 16–70  
-year-old Finnish residents from 1988 to 2004. Each worker and their employer 
in these data have a unique identification code. In addition, information on the 
workers’ spouses is included, which makes it possible to create a sample of 
couples and follow them several years after the event of a job loss. We focus on 
couples where one spouse lost his or her job due to a plant closure (or mass 
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layoff) in the years 1991–1993. As a comparison group we use similar couples 
who were not affected by a plant closure (mass layoff). We follow each couple 
for 4 years before the job loss and 11 to 13 years after the job loss in order to 
investigate the changes in their fertility in post-displacement years.    
Our set-up and the data allow us to study the causal effects of income shocks on 
a couple's fertility behavior at the micro-level. Unlike previous studies (Lindo 
2010, Amialchuk 2011, Del Bono, Weber and Winter-Ebmer 2012), we focus on 
couples and can distinguish between the woman’s and her spouse’s job loss, and 
thus make a distinction between the shock to the woman’s career and a pure 
income shock. We also study how job displacement affects family income, joint 
employment decisions and divorce probability. This helps us to better understand 
the mechanism through which job displacement affects fertility behavior. 
Moreover, the very long time span makes it possible to distinguish between the 
impact on postponement and completed fertility. Career and income shocks may 
force a couple to postpone childbearing without having an impact on completed 
fertility. The rich data also allow us to examine how this effect varies by various 
observable dimensions, such as education, the spouse’s income, family 
composition, etc.    
We find that a female job loss decreases fertility. For every 100 displaced 
females there are approximately three less children born. The effect is stronger 
for women with higher education and for high-wage earners. The negative effect 
of a woman’s job displacement may be explained by career concerns after the job 
loss. This may also explain why we find that job displacement has a stronger 
effect on women with higher education. Women with higher education are more 
attached to the labor market and more concerned about losing human capital 
during career breaks. They do not want to suffer from long employment breaks 
after a job loss and decide to postpone child bearing to better times. When 
analyzing the impact of male job loss on a couples’ fertility behavior we find that 
his job loss has a much weaker and insignificant effect on fertility than if the 
woman had lost her job. Since men are less engaged in the care of young 
children, we expect a man’s job loss to affect fertility mainly through income.  
The result suggests that income does not influence a couple’s fertility behavior. 
The results are in line with the study using Austrian data by Del Bono, Weber 
and Winter-Ebmer (2012) who also find that a woman’s job displacement 
decreases fertility, especially for highly educated women. They also conclude 
that the possible mechanism is not the income effect, but the difficulties women 
face in re-establishing their careers after the job loss. Despite the fact that we find 
that the man’s job loss results to a very long-lasting and even stronger impact on 
total family income than the woman’s job loss, the man’s job loss has no impact 
on completed fertility. This is in contrast with the study by Lindo (2010), which 
provides some, although not very robust, evidence that the man’s job 
displacement decreases fertility in the US. The difference with his and our 
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findings suggests that the effect of income on fertility may depend on 
institutional factors, such as the costs of higher education and the access to health 
care.   
2.2.3 Children, Labor Supply and Income: Evidence from Exogenous 
Variation in Family Size in Finland   
The third essay in the dissertation considers the causal effect of children on 
maternal employment, wages and income in a Nordic welfare state, in which 
there is a high female employment rate and a strong preference for children's 
home care promoted by the state. Nordic countries – Finland among them – have 
been the pioneers in developing models for combining work and family. Policies 
adopted in the Nordic countries have inspired many other European countries to 
create their own family policies and many countries today are making decisions 
on their family policies. When countries decide, which family policies to 
implement and how to develop the existing policies, the pros and cons of each 
model should be recognised. As in all Nordic countries, Finland has such family 
policies as job-protected parental leave, low cost-high quality public day care and 
the right to take time off for the care of a sick child. Despite sharing many of the 
key features of the family policies common to all Nordic countries, Finland has a 
very unique model of reconciling maternal employment and the care of small 
children.  
A key feature that distinguishes Finland from other Nordic countries is the 
families’ preference for the home care of small children, which is promoted by 
the right to extend the job-protected parental leave with the support of Child 
Home Care subsidies until the youngest child is three.   
The identification of the causal effect of children on labor market outcomes is 
based on two sorts of “natural experiments”: (i) families' preference for sibling 
sex mix or (ii) the birth of twins. The same sex instrument is based on the 
observation that parents of same-sex siblings are more likely to go on to have an 
additional child (see e.g. Westoff et al., 1963, Williamson, 1976, Angrist and 
Evans, 1998). Because the birth of twins is virtually randomly assigned, an event 
of twinning creates potentially exogenous variation in family size.1 The analysis 
is based on Employment Statistics Database of Statistics Finland merged to 
Population Information System of the Population Register Centre to include 
information on childbirths. The combined data set covers the years 1988–2004.  
The results show that having more than two children decreases the maternal labor 
supply by 26 percentage points. Furthermore, this effect varies by marital status 
and the spouse's earnings and by the mother's education. Cohabiting and married 
                                              
 
1 The randomness of twinning may be violated due to infertility treatments. 
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women's employment decreases by almost 40 percentage points. Mothers with 
higher education have almost 35 percentage points and mothers with secondary 
education have even over 40 percentage points lower employment probability 
after another child. For fathers and for single mothers children have no effect on 
employment.    
The estimated effect of children on Finnish mothers employment is remarkably 
larger than the ones found in the earlier empirical research on maternal 
employment in the US, in the UK and in Sweden using the same identification 
strategy (see Angrist and Evans 1998, Iacovou 2001, Hirvonen 2010). Although 
there are several possible reasons for larger effect in Finland, the main 
explanation is probably the differences in the labor market institutions between 
these countries and Finland: mainly the job-protected maternity leave of up to 
three years per child.   
2.2.4 Baby and Pay: The Family Gap in Finland   
The fourth essay in this dissertation is an attempt to analyse the effect of career 
interruptions due to parental leave to both the mothers’ and fathers’ subsequent 
wages. Having children causes different labour market outcomes, especially for 
women. Most women withdraw completely from the labour market to care for 
the child. However, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of career 
interruptions due to childbirth for those women who remain in the labour force 
and return to work after the formal maternity scheme.  
The data set is a unique linked employer-employee panel data set (FLEED) 
covering almost the entire private sector in Finland during the years 1995–2002. 
Thus, it is possible to control for unobserved time constant heterogeneity among 
individuals in the data. In addition, information about parental leave from Social 
Insurance Institution of Finland has been combined to the FLEED data base. The 
main advantage of these data is that it includes registered data about a person’s 
hourly earnings provided by the Confederation of Finnish Industries. By using 
the hourly wage I am able to control for the hours worked. When the hourly 
wage is not used, the possible differences in monthly (or yearly) earnings can be 
due to the different number of hours worked. If it is more likely for women than 
men to cut down their working time when there are little children in the family, it 
is very important to control for hours worked.   
There appears to be a significant negative relation between career interruptions 
due to childbirth and subsequent wages for women in Finland. The relative loss 
in earnings of mothers is almost 7%. The effect for men is quite the opposite: 
their wages are either unaffected or even increased. However, this result is 
mainly due to the fact that men take only short leaves – less than a month. For 
those men, who take significantly longer periods of parental leave, the effect of 
the leave on wages becomes negative. The estimates from wage equations are 
11 
 
higher when log monthly earnings are used instead of log hourly earnings. This 
indicates, that a remarkable part of the cost of having children comes in that 
women, when becoming mothers, cut down their working hours (or do not take 
extra hours). Men, on the other hand, tend to work longer hours when there are 
children in the family, which explains the positive effect of a short parental leave 
on wages. However, the negative effect of taking parental leave on wages of 
women and positive for men remains even when log hourly earnings are used as 
a dependent variable. For women, the most obvious explanation would be human 
capital depreciation: women suffer from skill atrophy during the parental leave 
and therefore are less productive at work after the career break. For men, the 
positive effect of having children on wages, even after controlling for the hours 
worked, could reflect unobserved heterogeneity: men who are successful in the 
labor market, are also successful in the marriage market.    
The results are in line with the previous empirical evidence which finds a 
negative impact of career breaks on mothers' wages and an increase both in 
income and in hours worked of fathers after the childbirth (Waldfogel 1997, 
Lundberg and Rose 2000, 2002, Hyung-Jai et al. 2008, Napari 2010). However, 
the results of this study are mainly descriptive. The main drawback of this essay 
is the chosen estimation method. The Heckman selection model, and particularly 
the chosen identifying variable to estimate the model is outdated: being 
unmarried is a poor predictor of being childless in Finland in the mid-1990s. 
Hence, this essay fails to use credible identification in the analysis and is above 
anything a lesson for the researcher how important it is to carefully consider the 
relevance of the used methods.     
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The Effect of Children on Lifetime Earnings and 
Income: Evidence from Adult Same-Sex Twins   
Abstract  
The family gap in earnings is often interpreted as women bearing the 
consequences of having children. Fathers, on the other hand, seem to benefit 
from children in the form of “marriage premium” in their wages. The causal 
effect of children on earnings, however, is difficult to examine due to the 
unobserved heterogeneity between mothers and non-mothers and between fathers 
and non-fathers. This study uses a cohort of same-sex twins (born between 1944 
and 1950) linked to administrative records on annual taxable earnings and 
income to examine the causal effect of children on lifetime income. Using 
identical same-sex twins allows controlling for unobserved genetic and 
environmental factors. The study shows that parenthood increases lifetime labor 
earnings and income around 30 to 40% for both men and women.  
JEL: J13, J22   
Keywords: family gap, income, children, selection, twin data.   
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1. Introduction   
The connection between fertility and women’s labor market outcomes has been 
of economic interest for decades. The empirical focus has been on the link 
between the number of children, and women’s labor supply and wages.1 Fathers, 
on the other hand, are documented to earn more than non-fathers.2 The major 
challenge, however, in all empirical studies on fertility and labor market 
outcomes is to identify a causal effect of children on labor market outcomes. The 
causal effect of children on wages is difficult to estimate because of the 
unobservability of the counterfactual. Observing the same person in two different 
states – with and without children – at the same time is impossible. Hence, 
econometricians are forced to come up with other strategies to identify the “true” 
impact that children have on their parents’ earnings.    
This study uses a “natural experiment” – identical same-sex twins – to study the 
causal effect of children on their parents’ income. Identical or monozygous (MZ) 
multiple births are truly “natural natural experiments” for two reasons. First, MZ-
twinning is considered to be a random event: only about 1/80 births in 
Caucasians3 is a twin birth, and of these about 30% produce MZ twins.4 Second, 
identical twins are the only source of humans that have identical genotypes.    
To my knowledge, the present study is the first one to use identical twins to 
overcome the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals in the estimation. It is 
likely that individuals differ from each other in ways unobserved to the 
econometrician that affect both the number of children and earnings. Unobserved 
heterogeneity – for example “taste for work” – is presumably an even more 
severe source of bias when comparing the labor market outcomes between 
parents and childless individuals. When using twins, I am able to control for 
family background characteristics and genetic endowment that cannot be 
observed.5 More importantly, estimation with only identical twins is less subject 
to “ability bias” that arises from differences in innate ability.    
                                              
 
1 The majority of empirical studies find a negative correlation between fertility and female labor supply 
and wages. See, e.g. Gronau (1973), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), Schultz (1990), and Goldin (1995) 
on labor supply and Gronau (1988) and Korenman and Neumark (1992) on wages. 
2 For the association between male wages and marriage see, e.g. Korenman and Neumark (1991), Gray 
(1997). 
3 Finns are of the Caucasian type. 
4 There may be a small genetic component to the twinning rate, particularly for dizygotic (DZ) twins, 
though also familial MZ-twinning has been described. The DZ-twinning rate is dependent on family size 
and maternal age. (Kaprio et al., 1979, 20.) 
5 Previously, Neumark and Korenman (1994) have used data on sisters to control unobserved family 
attributes, such as unmeasured and equal parental investment in their daughters' human capital. 
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A large body of economic literature uses (identical) twins as a credible 
identification strategy. Particularly, twins are used to study the causal effect of 
schooling on earnings beginning from Ashenfelter’s and Krueger’s (1994) 
famous twin study. Twins are also employed in studies concerning the effect of 
schooling on assortative mating and fertility (see e.g Behrman and Rosenzweig 
2002, Kohler et al. 2010). A recent study of Amin and Behrman (2014) use 
identical twins to estimate the impact of schooling on fertility. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the effect that children have on their parents’ income has not been 
investigated by using identical same-sex twins.    
The unique feature of this analysis is that I can study the impact of children on 
their mother's lifetime income. So far, empirical evidence on the motherhood 
wage penalty is limited to the immediate years following childbirth. The 
occurance of a family gap in earnings around childbirth is not very surprising 
since almost all mothers experience a career break after giving birth. The 
interesting question is whether these career breaks related to the child have 
consequences on the lifetime labor earnings as could be expected based on the 
theory of human capital. Finland is a particularly interesting country in this 
respect, since it has a long tradition of family policies – such as public, low-cost 
day care and a job-protected maternity leave – which aim at facilitating the 
reconcilement of family and work and hence to improve the labor market 
outcomes of mothers. Moreover, I analyse the impact of children on fathers' 
earnings. The wage effects of fatherhood are much less known in economics 
literature than those of motherhood.   
Another interesting feature of Finland – and of other Nordic countries – is that 
the earnings losses during career breaks related to having a child are 
compensated by earnings-related maternity and paternity allowances. Hence, 
during these career breaks, workers receive a part of their salary and continue to 
pay pension contributions. This means that the impact of children on lifetime 
income – including pensions – might not be significant. The combined data set 
used in this study serves as an astounding ground for investigating this particular 
feature of a welfare state. The data set has various different administrative 
measures for the financial state of a person. For the purposes of this study, the 
following two are the most relevant ones: annual taxable earnings and annual 
taxable income. The annual taxable earnings are the sum of earned and 
entrepreneurial income received by income recipients during the year.6 The 
measure of annual taxable income is income that is subject to state taxation. It 
includes (i) wage income, (ii) entrepreneurial income and (iii) other income 
subject to state taxation – such as other earned income (e. g. dividends, which are 
taxed as earned income), (iv) pension income, (v) social security transfers subject 
to state taxation – such as unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, maternity and 
                                              
 
6 For a more thorough description, see http://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/tyotulot_en.html. 
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paternity allowance, child home care allowance, study grant and adult education 
subsidy and other social security benefits.7    
I find that being a parent increases lifetime labor earnings and income around 30 
to 40% for both men and women. An important finding is also that the estimated 
impact of children is nonlinear: being a parent is what matters, not the number of 
children. It remains unclear, what causes such a large difference in lifetime labor 
earnings and income between parents and non-parents.   
The paper is organized as following. Next section describes the combined data 
set. Section 3 presents the empirical model and the main results. Section 4 
concludes.     
 
                                              
 
7 Social security benefits, which are not subject to state taxation are child benefit, general housing 
allowance and other forms of housing assistance, and labor market subsidy. 
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The Department of Public Health at the University of Helsinki established the 
Finnish Twin Cohort study for epidemiological studies on chronic diseases. 
COLTD contains information on symptoms of illnesses and reported diseases, 
use of drugs, physical characteristics, smoking, alcohol use, leisure time physical 
activity, and psycho-social factors collected from a baseline questionnaire study 
of the Finnish Twin Cohort study in 1975 and from its follow-up questionnaire 
studies in 1981 and 1990. All the three questionnaires have reached remarkably 
high response rates.    
COLTD is combined with the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data 
(FLEED) of Statistics Finland. FLEED consists of all Finnish residents aged 16–
70 and of all firms from year 1990 to 2004. The information on individuals is 
based on the Employment Statistics data base, which includes information on the 
labor market status of individuals and their background characteristics from 
different administrative registers. For instance, various earnings and income 
information are based on tax registers. With individual, plant and firm 
identification codes FLEED can be merged to other data sources. The combined 
data include selected information from COLTD from years 1975, 1981 and 1990 
(survey years) and inclusive register based information, such as level and field of 
education, marital status and annual labor earnings and taxable income, for these 
twin pairs from FLEED in years 1990–2004.    
Since FLEED only begins in 1990, we include information on earnings and 
income from the Population Censuses of years 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. This 
allows to see the earnings profiles for over 30 years.   
There is no retrospective fertility information in the FLEED other than the 
number of individuals under the age of 18 living in the same household. Since 
the collection of the data began in 1990, this variable does not include children 
who died before 1990. More importantly, it does not contain those over the age 
of 18. For the purposes of this study, information on the total number of children 
born alive to each individual in COLTD is linked to these data. The information 
on the number of biological children and their birth year comes from the 
Population Information System (PIS) of the Population Register Centre. A short 
summary of the combined data set is presented in Table 1.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
 
the protocol attempted to develop comparable methods and data collection criteria, so that results from 
different registries could be subsequently comparable and even pooled. The protocol from the Miami 
Beach meeting formed the initial basis in the compilation of the Finnish Twin Registry and for the 
planning of the questionnaire studies. (Kaprio et al., 1979, 10–11.) 
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security benefits.15 The earnings and income variables are deflated with the cost 
of living index into 2010 euros.    
The key explanatory variable – total number of children born – is the number of 
children that were born (alive) by the year 1990 to individuals who had all their 
children by the year 1990 and who were childless in the year 1970. Hence, 
individuals with children in 1970 and individuals who had or continued to have 
children in 1990 or /and later are excluded from the sample. The reason to 
exclude those individuals with children in 1970 is to be able to observe pre-
children earnings.  
The cohort sizes and age profiles are presented in Table 2. In total, there are 2 
044 individuals in the sample, of whom 960 are women and 1 088 men.     
Table 2.  Age Profiles of the Sample Cohorts by Data Source 
Birth Year 
 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
Cohort of Older Like-Sexed Twins Data (COLTD) 
Observation 
year: 
Age Profiles 
1975 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 
1981 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 
1990 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 
Population Censuses (PC) 
Observation 
year: 
Age Profiles 
1970    26 25 24 23 22 21 20 
1975 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 
1980 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 
1985  41 40 39 38 37 36 35 
Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) 
Observation 
year: 
Age Profiles 
1990 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 
1991 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 
1992 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 
1993 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 
1994 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 
1995 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 
1996 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 
1997 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 
1998 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 
1999 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 
2000 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 
2001 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 
2002 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 
2003 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 
2004 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 
Obs./Year 100 186 234 302 374 362 490 
 
                                              
 
15 For more information, see http://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/valt_veronal_tu_en.html. 
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From 1990 onwards, the average earnigs of both mothers and childless women 
drop due to a very severe recession, which Finland experienced in the early 
1990s caused in part by the collapse of the Soviet Union – the main trade partner 
of Finland. However, mothers' earnings start to recover already in 1995, while no 
such recovery is seen for the earnings of childless women. On the contrary, the 
average earnings of childless women continue to decrease until the end of the 
observation period. Why do childless women suffer more long-lasting earnings 
losses due to the recession? One explanation could be that mothers were more 
likely to be employed in the public sector than childless women and hence were 
able to maintain their employment in the recession. It is often argued that public 
sector jobs have family-friendly attributes, such as security of employment and 
therefore are preferred by mothers. Unfortunately, based on the data, I am not 
able to say whether mothers were more often employed in the public sector than 
childless women. Childless women were perhaps more often employed in 
industries within the private sector that traded with the Soviet Union, such as in 
the textile industry. After the recession, the textile industry practically 
disappeared from Finland. Another explanation could be that during the recession 
those without children were more likely to be laid off in the mass-layoffs. 
Furthermore, it might be that mothers had a stronger incentive to find new 
employment after possible layoffs. Last, it could also be that during non-
employment time children kept mothers more re-employable. For example, 
family-life might have prevented mothers from obtaining an unhealthy lifestyle, 
such as using alcohol excessively.   
In fact, Table 3 indicates that one reason for mothers' better labor market 
performance seems to be health: over 25% of childless women receive disability 
pension, whereas only 10% of mothers do so in 2004. Do children affect one's 
health positively or are healthier people more likely to become parents? To get at 
least some indication of this, Table 4 describes selected health information of the 
twin survey questionnaires from the years 1975, 1981 and 1990.17 Childless 
women report to have chestpain twice as often as mothers, and to use medication 
for a heart condition four times as often as mothers in 1975. On the other hand, 
mothers report to have medication for hypertensive twice as often as childless 
women. Otherwise, self-reported health measures in 1975 do not differ much 
between mothers and childless women. Moreover, there is no indication of 
difference in the use of alcohol between mothers and childless women. In the 
1981 and 1990 questionnaires childless women report to smoke more than 
mothers. The share of those who have reported having passed out because of 
alcohol use is higher for childless women in 1981, but not in 1990. Childless 
women also report to have chestpain and medication for a heart condition more 
often both in 1981 and 1990. Based on BMI, a higher share of childless women 
                                              
 
17 The respond rate of the sample is almost 100%.  
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are also classified as overweight. Unfortunately, there have not been any 
questionnaires after 1990. It would be interesting to see how the health of these 
individuals has developed after the early 1990s recession.    
Table 3.  Demographic and Other Background Characteristics 
 Females Males 
 All Childless Mothers All Childless Fathers
REGISTER DATA: 
Age in 1990 42.2 42.5 42.0 42.2 42.3 42.2
Years of schooling in 
1990 
11.9 12.1 11.9 11.9 11.2 12.1
Number of children 
in 1990 
1.382 0 1.922 1.493 0 2.053
House owner in 
1990 
0.840 0.789 0.860 0.858 0.795 0.822
Spouse's earnings in 
1990 
32 826.49 27 530.64 33 626.20 19 144.42 17 347.23 19 363.29
Family status in 1970 
Single 0.831 0.929 0.794 0.893 0.970 0.863
Married 0.168 0.071 0.205 0.107 0.030 0.135
Divorced 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0
Family status in 1990 
Single 0.261 0.702 0.089 0.192 0.680 0.009
Married 0.646 0.212 0.815 0.692 0.192 0.880
Divorced 0.093 0.086 0.096 0.060 0.030 0.072
Family status in 2004 
Single 0.283 0.688 0.125 0.237 0.727 0.053
Married 0.534 0.208 0.661 0.630 0.222 0.783
Divorced 0.183 0.104 0.214 0.133 0.051 0.164
Pre-children labor market outcomes in 1970 
Earnings 7 678.50 7 101.22 7 903.23 10 458.73 8 935.39 11 030.7
Income 7 734.82 7 175.59 7 952.52 10 818.21 9 229.8 11 414.73
Employed 0.698 0.662 0.712 0.632 0.609 0.641
Labor market outcomes in 1990 
Earnings 19 691.55 20 099.77 19 532.63 29 302.77 21 120.12 32 375.14
Income 19 691.55 20 099.77 1 9532.63 29 302.77 21 120.12 32 375.14
Employed 0.869 0.851 0.876 0.892 0.788 0.932
Labor market outcomes in 2004 
Earnings 20 217.43 17 424.41 21 304.73 27 505.41 16 528.78 31 626.85
Income 23 949.00 22 489.76 24 517.07 32 867.12 22 761.03 36 661.70
Employed 0.702 0.587 0.747 0.654 0.478 0.721
Unemployment 
pension 
0.010 0.019 0.007 0.002 0.007 0
Disability pension 0.144 0.253 0.101 0.169 0.290 0.124
Old-Age pension 0.015 0.019 0.013 0.022 0.007 0.028
Obs. 960 269 691 1 088 297 791
 
The overall picture of fathers and childless men is similar to that of mothers and 
childless women (see Table 3). Of men, fathers are more educated, by one year 
on average, than childless men. Future-fathers are also more often married 
(13.5%) than those men who remain childless (3%) in 1970. Moreover, the share 
of married among fathers has increased to almost 90% by 1990, while the 
majority of childless men are still single.   
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Before starting to have children (in the year 1970) the future fathers earn 
significantly more than those men who remain childless (see Table 3 and Figure 
2). Future fathers are also more often employed, but the difference in 
employment rate is not enourmous. By the year 1990, the gap in earnings has 
widened further. While childless women earn on average more than mothers 
between the years 1970 and 1990, childless men's average earnings never exceed 
those of fathers. This is understandable since fathers do not experience such 
breaks in employment due to childbirths as mothers. There is also a significant 
difference in the share of employed between fathers and childless men in 1990. 
In 2004, childless men do, on average, far worse than fathers in every labor 
market aspect: their earnings are only half of the fathers' earnings and their 
employment rate is less than 50% – over 20 percentage points lower than that of 
fathers. Like for childless women, the explanation for worse labor market 
performance seems to be health related: childless men receive disability pension 
three times as often as fathers in 2004 (see Table 3).   
Like with women, the self-reported health measures do not differ much in 1975 
(see Table 4). Only smoking seems to be more common among fathers. In 1981, 
a higher share of childless men can be classified as overweight. They also report 
feeling chestpain more often, but the difference in the use of medication for a 
heart condition is not significant. However, childless men report to have 
medication for hypertensive twice as often as fathers in 1981. There is also some 
indication of different drinking habits. In 1990, 20% of childless men report to 
have passed out at least once during the last year, while of fathers 15% have done 
so.   
Since I want to see whether those who will become parents and those who will 
remain childless differ in their labor market earnings potential even before the 
children are born, I have excluded from the sample those twin pairs of whom 
either one or both had children already in 1970. The demographic and some other 
background charasteristics of these twin pairs are shown in Table 5. Furthermore, 
the earnings and income pattern of those excluded from the sample - those who 
had children already in 1970 and those who continue to have children beyond 
year 1989 (and their co-twins) – are shown in Figures 3 and 4.   
Of female twin pairs, those excluded from the sample are on average older and 
less educated than those included in the sample. This is not a surprise, since older 
women are more likely to have children in 1970 and less educated women 
usually start to have children earlier than women who pursue further education. 
There is also a significant difference in the completed fertility between the 
women excluded and included in the sample. The women excluded from the 
sample – because both or at least the other co-twin had a child or children already 
in 1970 – have on average 2.1 children whereas the women in the sample have 
on average only 1.4 children – which is a very low number for the age cohorts. 
Since Table 3 shows that mothers in the sample have on average 1.9 children, the 
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share of childless women must be higher than among those excluded from the 
sample. To sum up, the sample selected to this analysis concentrates on women 
who are more educated, more often childless and have a better labor market 
position already in 1970.   
Table 4.  Health Measures of the Twin Survey 
 Females Males 
 All Childless Mothers All Childless Fathers
SURVEY 
DATA: 
      
Health measures in 1975 
Smoking 
(packs/year) 
1.438 1.324 1.486 4.060 3.519 4.269
Heavy use of 
alcohol 
0.074 0.072 0.074 0.423 0.417 0.425
BMI 21.1 21.2 21.1 23.2 23.3 23.2
Obesity 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.058 0.054 0.059
Chestpain 0.033 0.054 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.024
Medication for 
heart condition 
0.009 0.019 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003
Medication for 
hypertensive 
0.018 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.011 0.011
Health measures in 1981 
Smoking 
(packs/year) 
2.304 2.627 2.182 6.143 6.164 6.136
Heavy use of 
alcohol 
0.080 0.079 0.079 0.422 0.441 0.415
Passout 0.057 0.071 0.052 0.184 0.187 0.183
BMI 21.8 21.5 21.9 24.0 24.2 23.9
Obesity 0.101 0.123 0.093 0.138 0.192 0.118
Chestpain 0.040 0.053 0.036 0.036 0.049 0.032
Medication for 
heart condition 
0.007 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.010
Medication for 
hypertensive 
0.029 0.026 0.030 0.019 0.031 0.015
Health measures in 1990 
Smoking 
(packs/year) 
3.603 3.792 3.540 8.966 8.490 9.127
Heavy use of 
alcohol 
0.076 0.074 0.078 0.278 0.256 0.287
Passout 0.053 0.048 0.055 0.164 0.202 0.151
BMI 23.1 22.4 23.4 25.1 25.0 25.1
Obesity 0.292 0.320 0.281 0.380 0.431 0.360
Chestpain 0.047 0.052 0.045 0.054 0.061 0.052
Medication for 
heart condition 
0.012 0.023 0.008 0.025 0.024 0.025
Medication for 
hypertensive 
0.062 0.072 0.058 0.059 0.083 0.051
Obs. 960 269 691 1 088 297 791
Note: Heavy use of alcohol is based on the following question “Does it happen that at least once amonth 
and on the same occasion you drink more than five bottless of beer or more than bottle of wine or more 
than half a bottle of hard liquor?”. Answer altervatives: No, yes (question #58 in 1975, #59 in 1981, #73 
in 1990). Passed out is based on the following question “How often have you passed out while using 
alcohol during the last year?”. Answer alternatives: Not once, once, two-three times, four-six times, 
seven times or more (question #60 in 1981, #74 in 1990).   
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Likewise, of men the ones included in the sample are also younger and more 
educated than those excluded from the sample. However, the difference in 
average years of education is not as large as between women included in and 
excluded from the sample. In contrast to women, men included in the sample 
perform worse in the labor market in 1970 than those men excluded from the 
sample. There is also a large difference in the total number of children between 
the men included in and excluded from the sample. Like female twin pairs 
included in the sample, male twin pairs also have, on average, less children than 
typical. The men included in the sample have on average 1.5 children and men 
excluded have 2.2 children. Again, since fathers in the sample have on average 
2.1 children (see Table 3), which is close to the average number of children 
among excluded men, the sample selected consists of more childless men. In 
short, the selected male twin pairs are younger, slightly more educated, but have 
worse labor market position and less often children than those excluded from the 
sample.   
Table 5.  Comparison of Demographic and Other Background 
Characteristics of Those Included in the Sample and of Those 
Excluded from the Sample 
 Females Males 
 Included Excluded Included Excluded
Age in 1990 42.2 43.5 42.2 43.6
Education in 1990:  
Primary 0.325 0.510 0.372 0.461
Secondary 0.391 0.374 0.369 0.330
Tertiary 0.284 0.117 0.258 0.209
Years of schooling 11.9 10.8 11.9 11.4
Family status in 
1990: Couple 
0.715 0.773 0.762 0.851
Number of 
children in 1990 
1.382 2.107 1.493 2.201
Spouse's earnings 
in 1990 
32 826.49 28 817.01 19 144.42 17 973.77
Labor market outcomes in 1970 
Earnings 7 678.50 6 804.01 10 458.73 13 569.59
Income 7 734.82 6 909.02 10 818.21 14 248.93
Employed 0.698 0.625 0.632 0.794
Labor market outcomes in 1990 
Earnings 19 691.55 18 646.90 29 302.77 31 258.84
Income 19 691.55 18 646.90 29 302.77 31 258.84
Employed 0.869 0.876 0.892 0.931
Labor market outcomes in 2004 
Earnings 20 217.43 15 679.38 27 505.41 23 483.84
Income 23 949.00 21 772.65 32 867.12 30 360.94
Employed 0.702 0.616 0.654 0.609
Obs. 960 1 020 1 088 798
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2.3.2 Within-twin Family Size Difference   
Twins share the same family background. Identical twins also share the same 
genes. Thus, they are more similar in aspects of “ability” or “motivation” than 
two random persons with the same observed charasteristics – such as age, years 
of schooling and occupation. Hence, the within-twin difference in earnings by 
parent status is a better measure of the impact of children on earnings than the 
simple OLS estimation. The within-twin estimation of identical twins controls for 
such unobserved differences between parents and non-parents as family 
background and genetic ability. Although similar in terms of innate ability or 
earnings potential, some necessary difference within a twin pair has to exist in 
order to be able to identify the impact of children on income. That is, a difference 
in the number of children.    
Table 6 shows the within-twin pair difference in the number of children for 
monozygotic (MZ) twins – in other words, for identical twins. This raises the 
obvious question: If so identical, why do twins differ in the number of children 
they have? There could be various reasons for this. First of all, even though twins 
are identical, their partners are not. Second, individual-specific shocks – such as 
an illness or accident – can affect the fertility pattern of one twin but not of the 
other. Third, even though identical in their genes, twins may have non-identical 
preferences with respect to the desired number of children. Table 6 also reports 
the within-twin differences in fertility for the whole twin sample (All) and for 
dizygotic (DZ) twins.   
Table 6.  Within-Twin Difference in the Total Number of Children Born 
 Females Males 
Difference All (%) DZ (%) MZ (%) All (%) DZ (%) MZ (%) 
0 174 (36.3) 110 (34.5) 64 (39.8) 200 (36.8) 128 (34.4) 72 (41.9) 
1 184 (38.3) 127 (39.8) 57 (35.4) 187 (34.4) 130 (34.9) 57 (33.1) 
2 98 (20.4) 65 (20.4) 33 (20.5) 117 (21.5) 80 (21.5) 37 (21.5) 
3 19 (4.0) 14 (4.4) 5 (3.1) 33 (6.1) 29 (7.8) 4 (2.3) 
4 5 (1.0) 3 (0.9) 2 (1.2) 5 (1.0) 4 (1.21) 1 (0.6) 
5 - -  - 2 (0.4) 1 (0.3) 1 (0.6) 
Obs. 480 319  161 544 372 172  
 
Of female and male twins more than 1/3 has exactly the same number of 
children. With this respect, identical twins indeed seem to be more similar than 
non-identical (or dizygotic) twins. Of identical female twins approximately 40% 
compeleted their fertility with the same number, while of non-identical female 
twins only 34% did so. For identical male twins the similarity between their 
family size is even higher at 42%, compared to 34% of non-identical male twins. 
Crucial for the identification strategy of this study, the share of twin pairs who do 
not have the exact same number of children is higher. Altogether, 64% of female 
and male twin pairs differ in their fertility. The most typical difference is a 
difference of one child: 38% of female and 34% of male twins have either one 
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child more or less than their co-twin. A difference of two children is also a quite 
typical one: around 1/5 of both females and males differ in their family size by 
two children. A small share of twin pairs differ in their fertility by three children: 
4% of female and 6% of male twins fall into this category. Larger differences are 
even more uncommon.   
If the difference of one child is the most typical one within a twin pair, the most 
popular family size of these twins is a family of two children. Around 40% of 
twin cohorts born between 1944 and 1950 have two children (Table 7). For 
women, having a child (21%) is more common than being childless (18%). Of 
men a higher share are childless: 22% compared to 20% with one child only.  
Table 7.  Total Number of Children Born 
 Females Males 
 Children  All (%) DZ (%) MZ (%) All (%) DZ (%) MZ (%) 
0 269 (28.0) 168 (26.3) 101 (31.4) 297 (27.3) 195 (26.2) 102 (29.7) 
1 217 (22.6) 149 (23.4) 68 (21.1) 208 (19.1) 142 (19.1) 66 (19.2) 
2 339 (35.3) 232 (36.4) 107 (33.2) 382 (35.1) 265 (35.6) 117 (34.1) 
3 113 (1.9) 76 (11.8) 38 (11.8) 162 (14.9) 116 (15.6) 46 (13.4) 
4 18 (0.3) 12 (1.9) 6 (1.9) 31 (2.9) 22 (3.0) 9 (3.4) 
5 3 (0.1) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.6) 7 (0.6) 4 (0.3) 3 (2.6) 
6 1 1 (0.2) - - - (0.5) -  
7 - -  - 1 (0.1) - 1 (0.3) 
Obs. 960 638  322 1 088 744 344  
 
2.3.3 To Whom Are these Twins Married?   
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.1, the share of single women is higher among 
female twin pairs selected into the sample than those exluded from the sample.18 
Now, the question is if the share of single women is the same among childless 
women and mothers. Table 8 shows that 66% of childless women are single in 
1990, while only 14% of mothers are so. Of childless men 70% are single, 
whereas of fathers only 7%.    
It is also worth noting from Table 9, that of those childless women, who have a 
spouse, the majority have a spouse, whose earnings belong to the bottom or 
medium category of the earnings distribution. In contrast, the majority of mothers 
have a high-earning spouse. The majority of childless men have a spouse from 
the bottom of the earnings distribution. Fathers' spouses have earnings almost 
equally in the bottom and medium category of the earnings distribution. Of 
fathers 16% and of childless men 10% have a high-earning spouse.   
 
                                              
 
18 I have excluded from the sample those twin pairs, of whom either one or both had children already in 
1970. 
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Table 8.  Do Childless People Have a Spouse in 1990? 
 Childless Women Mothers 
 All DZ MZ All DZ MZ 
Single 179 (65.9%) 115 (68.0%) 64 (62.4%) 95 (13.7%) 70 (14.9%) 25 (11.3%) 
Couple 90 (33.5%) 53 (31.6%) 37 (36.6%) 596 (86.3%) 400 (85.1%) 196 (88.7%) 
Married 57 (21.2%) 32 (19.1%) 25 (24.8%) 563 (81.5%) 376 (80.0%) 187 (84.6%) 
Divorced 23 (8.6%) 16 (9.5%) 7 (6.9%) 66 (9.6%) 46 (9.8%) 20 (9.1%) 
Obs. 269 168 101 691 470 221 
 
 Childless Men Fathers 
 All DZ MZ All DZ MZ 
Single 207 (69.7%) 142 (72.8%) 65 (63.7%) 52 (6.6%) 36 (6.6%) 16 (6. %) 
Couple 90 (30.3%) 53 (27.2%) 37 (36.3%) 739 (93.4%) 513 (93.4%) 226 (93.4%) 
Married 57 (19.2%) 36 (18.5%) 21 (20.6%) 696 (88.0%) 484 (88.2%) 212 (87.6%) 
Divorced 9 (3.0%) 3 (1.5%) 6 (5.9%) 57 (7.2%) 36 (6.6%) 21 (8.7%) 
Obs. 297 195 102 791 549 242 
Note: Married are a subgroup of Couples and Divorced is a subgroup of Singles. 
 
Table 9.  Spouses' Earnings in 1990 
 Females Males 
Spouse's earnings: Childless women Mothers Childless men Fathers 
bottom 23 (25.6%) 107 (18.0%) 46 (51.1%) 329 (44.5%) 
medium 26 (28.9%) 154 (25.8%) 35 (38.9%) 290 (39.2%) 
high 41 (45.6%) 335 (56.2%) 9 (10.0%) 120 (16.2%) 
Obs. 90 596 90 739 
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shows the within-twin estimate for identical female twins only. Since identical 
twins not only share the same family but the same genes, both the family 
component and the ability component drop out of the twin fixed-effects version 
of the earnings equation. The last three columns present the same results for male 
twins. There is a positive association between children and lifetime earnings of 
women. In the within-twin estimation the effect of children on lifetime earnings 
is 13–14%, but the result is not statistically significant, when only identical twins 
are used in the estimation. The statistical insignificance is most likely due to the 
small sample size. For men there is, as expected, a positive association between 
number of children and earnings of 23%. In the within-twin estimation, the 
estimate is still positive, but 10 percentage points smaller. For identical male 
twins the effect is even smaller (8%) and insignifigant, but this is again most 
likely due to a small sample size. Hence, a large part of the observed “fatherhood 
premium” in lifetime earnings is due to family background. Nevertheless, both 
mothers and fathers have an economically significant “parent premium” in their 
lifetime earnings.   
If the impact of children is nonlinear in nature, Model 1 does not reveal it. 
Therefore, I estimate the nonlinear Model 2 in order to see, whether the first 
child has a different impact on earnings than additional children. Based on the 
results from Model 2, the picture of the effect of children on earnings becomes 
somewhat different. There is a positive “parent premium” in earnings due to the 
first child. This premium is economically quite sizeable: of 40 percentage points 
increase for men and 30 percentage points increase for women. Moreover, the 
results show that the children do have a nonlinear impact on earnings with the 
first child having the largest effect.    
The last model is an extension of Model 1. In Model 3, I add a dummy-variable 
for being a parent to estimate the Model 1 more efficiently. The results based on 
Model 3 support the interpretation from the results of Model 2: being a parent 
affects labor earnings positively. There could be several explanations for this 
“parent premium” in earnings. Those without children may be a negatively 
selected group of individuals – as it seems from Table 3 for men particularly. 
This could be the case if the childless persons have experienced an individual 
specific shock in their lives, which prevents them from making both children and 
money. Second, it might be that having a child really improves productivity – 
whether it is due to parenthood changing one’s personality or use of time. Third, 
having a family could be a signal from a responsibility, commitment, prestige, 
etc. – things that are valued by the employer. Last, a child premium may infact 
be explained by so-called in-group bias, meaning that people have a tendency to 
favor their own kind and are more altruistic toward others in their own group. If 
being a parent is something that specifies such a group and since most 
employers, managers and superiors are parents, this might be a potential 
explanation for a child premium in lifetime labor earnings.   
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Table 10.  Effect of Children on Lifetime Taxable Earnings and Income 
 Females Males 
 Twins treated as  
a sample of 
individuals 
Within-Twin Twins treated as 
a sample of 
individuals 
Within-Twin 
 OLS All MZ OLS All MZ
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is log average annual earnings between 1990-2004 
Model 1       
Number of 
children 
0.086* 
(0.044) 
0.134*
(0.070)
0.140
(0.134)
0.234***
(0.032)
0.132*** 
(0.044) 
0.084
(0.065)
    
Model 2   
First child 0.268** 
(0.128) 
0.337*
(0.190)
0.338
(0.228)
0.606***
(0.120)
0.448*** 
(0.162) 
0.384**
(0.163)
   
Second 
child 
0.125 
(0.096) 
0.029
(0.150)
-0.075
(0.230)
0.087
(0.091)
0.041 
(0.113) 
-0.148
(0.129)
   
Third child -0.229* 
(0.131) 
0.059
(0.205)
0.180
(0.437)
0.117
(0.075)
-0.066 
(0.095) 
0.078
(0.139)
   
Model 3   
Number of 
children 
-0.033 
(0.060) 
0.054
(0.092)
0.103
(0.181)
0.077**
(0.038)
0.023 
(0.052) 
0.023
(0.072)
   
Parent 0.373** 
(0.157) 
0.266
(0.221)
0.128
(0.250)
0.541***
(0.129)
0.416** 
(0.184) 
0.256
(0.185)
Obs. 914 457 154 1 030 515 159
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is log average annual income between 1990-2004 
Model 1       
Number of 
children 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.001
(0.032)
0.021
(0.048)
0.168***
(0.019)
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
0.085*
(0.043)
    
Model 2   
First child 0.086 
(0.057) 
0.084
(0.084)
0.113
(0.130)
0.479***
(0.062)
0.367*** 
(0.089) 
0.279**
(0.113)
   
 
 
Second 
child 
0.025 
(0.053) 
-0.002
(0.081)
-0.060
(0.087)
0.070
(0.050)
0.015 
(0.066) 
-0.010
(0.095)
   
Third child -0.154* 
(0.080) 
-0.105
(0.100)
0.028
(0.144)
0.007
(0.054)
-0.100 
(0.064) 
0.003
(0.106)
   
Model 3   
Number of 
children 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
-0.042
(0.043)
-0.005
(0.065)
0.025
(0.025)
-0.018 
(0.033) 
0.030
(0.047)
   
Parent 0.160** 
(0.075) 
0.141
(0.105)
0.089
(0.155)
0.482***
(0.071)
0.392*** 
(0.102) 
0.221*
(0.127)
Obs. 960 480 161 1 088 544 172
Notes: In Panel A the dependent variable is the log average annual taxable earnings between years 1990 
and 2004 (in 2010 euros). The estimation is based on 914 observation of female and 1 030 observation of 
male twins. In Panel B the dependent variable the log average annual taxable income between years 1990 
and 2004 (in 2010 euros). The estimation is based on 960 observation of female and 1 088 observation of 
male twins. Controls include birth year dummies (only in OLS). Robust standard errors are in parantheses. 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
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In Panel B the same results are reported – only the dependent variable is now log 
average annual taxable income. Since annual taxable income is the sum of wage 
income, entrepreneurial income and other income subject to state taxation – such 
as maternity leave benefits, unemployment benefits and other social security 
benefits, and pensions – this outcome is of major relevance. In Finland, some of 
the direct costs from childbearing are compensated – at least partly – through 
maternity and paternity leave benefits. Hence, individuals continue to contribute 
to their pensions also during these child-related employment breaks. The first 
child has, again, a positive impact on income. The size of this child premium for 
women is, however, much smaller compared to the premium in earnings, and 
also statistically insignificant. For men, the estimated effect of the first child on 
lifetime income is close to the effect on earnings.  
3.2.2 The Effect of Children on a Measure of Lifetime Earnings and 
Income: Pre-Children Earnings Capacity as a Control   
Next, I estimate Model 1 with the pre-children earnings of the year 1970 as a 
control. The reason to include the year 1970 earnings into the estimation is to 
control for the difference in the pre-children earnings capacity. In fact, especially 
for men there is a gap in pre-children average earnings as shown in Figure 2. The 
model is of the following form:  
݈݊ തܻ௜௝ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܥܪܫܮܦܴܧ ௜ܰ௝ + ߙଶܴܲܧ − ܥܪܫܮܦܴܧܰ	ܧܣܴܰܫܰܩܵ	ܫܰ	1970௜௝ + ߤ௝ + ߝ௜௝ 
݅ = 1,2, ݆ = 1,…݊	      
and the within-twin difference   
∆݈݊ തܻ௝ = ߙଵ∆ܥܪܫܮܦܴܧ ௝ܰ + ߙଶ∆ܴܲܧ − ܥܪܫܮܦܴܧܰ	ܧܣܴܰܫܰܩܵ	ܫܰ	1970௝ + ∆ߝ௝ 
The pre-children earnings of the year 1970 is also included in Models 2 and 3. 
When the dependent variable is the log average annual taxable income, the 
control is the pre-children income of 1970.  
Table 11 shows the results. Controlling for the pre-children earnings (or income) 
in 1970 does not change the results. This means that the differences in earnings 
due to children arise later.   
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Table 11.  Effect of Children on Lifetime Taxable Earnings and Income: 
Pre-Children Earnings and income of the year 1970 as a Control 
 Females Males 
 Twins treated as a 
sample of 
individuals 
Within-Twin Twins treated as 
a sample of 
individuals
Within-Twin
 OLS All MZ OLS All MZ
Panel A: Dependent variable is log average annual earnings between 1990-2004 
Model 1       
Number of 
children 
0.086* 
(0.044) 
0.135*
(0.070) 
0.139
(0.131)
0.229***
(0.031)
0.130*** 
(0.044) 
0.083
(0.067)
     
Model 2    
First child 0.260**  
(0.128) 
0.320*
(0.187) 
0.345
(0.236)
0.587***
(0.117)
0.443*** 
(0.161) 
0.383**
(0.166)
    
Second 
child 
0.129  
(0.096) 
0.043
(0.149) 
-0.082
(0.232)
0.091
(0.091)
0.039 
(0.113) 
-0.148
(0.129)
    
Third child -0.221*  
(0.132) 
0.062
(0.205) 
0.175
(0.432)
0.119
(0.076)
-0.066 
(0.095) 
0.078
(0.140)
    
Model 3    
Number of 
children 
-0.027  
(0.060) 
0.062
(0.091) 
0.098
(0.172)
0.078**
(0.038)
0.021 
(0.052) 
0.023
(0.074)
    
Parent 0.357**  
(0.156) 
0.243
(0.217) 
0.140
(0.242)
0.525***
(0.127)
0.415** 
(0.183) 
0.255
(0.185)
Obs. 914 457 154 1 030 515 159
       
Panel B: Dependent variable is log average annual income between 1990-2004 
Model 1       
Number of 
children 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.001
(0.032) 
0.022
(0.049)
0.163***
(0.018)
0.088*** 
(0.026) 
0.081*
(0.046)
     
Model 2    
First child 0.072 
(0.056) 
0.074
(0.086) 
0.113
(0.131)
0.463***
(0.061)
0.365*** 
(0.088) 
0.271**
(0.117)
    
 
 
Second 
child 
0.029 
(0.052) 
0.004
(0.080) 
-0.059
(0.086)
0.071
(0.051)
0.015 
(0.066) 
-0.008
(0.096)
    
Third child -0.142* 
(0.080) 
-0.102
(0.101) 
0.029
(0.140)
0.009
(0.054)
-0.099 
(0.064) 
-0.001
(0.108)
    
Model 3    
Number of 
children 
-0.037 
(0.033) 
-0.037
(0.043) 
-0.004
(0.060)
0.024
(0.025)
-0.019 
(0.033) 
0.027
(0.048)
    
Parent 0.136* 
(0.075) 
0.127
(0.108) 
0.087
(0.151)
0.468***
(0.070)
0.391*** 
(0.102) 
0.229*
(0.127)
Obs. 960 480 161 1 088 544 172
Notes: In Panel A the dependent variable is the log average annual taxable earnings between years 1990 
and 2004 (in 2010 euros). The estimation is based on 914 observation of female and 1 030 observation of 
male twins. In Panel B the dependent variable the log averageannual taxable income between years 1990 
and 2004 (in 2010 euros). The estimation is based on 960 observation of female and 1 088 observation of 
male twins. Controls include birth year dummies (only in OLS). Robust standard errors are in parantheses. 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
44 
 
 
3.2.3 The Estimated Impact of the First Child over the Time Period   
If the pre-children difference in earnings (in the year 1970) seen in Figures 1 and 
2 does not explain the parent premium in lifetime earnings and income, what 
does? One way to find this out is to see how the estimated “first child premium” 
or parent premium in earnings evolves over the study period. Following figures 
plot the estimates of the first-child dummy from Model 2, when the outcome is 
annual earnings instead of the log average earnings.20 The figures show the OLS, 
within-twin and within-MZ twins estimates. Interestingly, for women the within-
MZ twins estimates are even larger than the OLS estimates, as if some of the 
effect of motherhood was hidden behind differences in ability. Once family and 
ability are controlled for, the effect of motherhood on earnings becomes even 
larger – both good and bad. Figure 5 shows that after 1970 the estimated impact 
of the first child on mothers' earnings is negative until 1990. This is the time 
period when children are born to these women. After 1990 the effect turns 
positive. Since 1990 the estimated impact on earnings is also strongly increasing 
over time. The results suggest that mothers have either experienced a wage 
growth after the child birth period (1971–1989) or they survived better in terms 
of employment and earnings through the recession of the early 1990s. The 
estimated impact is similar when the outcome is annual income (Figure 6). When 
income is used, the effect of motherhood is mitigated: non-mothers receive either 
entrepreneurial income or social benefits more often than mothers during the 
1990s.   
For men, the within-MZ twin estimates are slightly smaller than the OLS 
estimates indicating that the OLS estimates exaggerate the positive impact of 
fatherhood in earnings. This means that the parent premium in fathers' earnings is 
to some extent due to unobserved differences in family background and genetic 
ability. However, the unobserved differences in these factors due not solely 
explain the parent premium in male earnings. Figure 7 shows that the estimated 
impact of the first child on fathers' earnings is positive throughout the study 
period. Moreover, the estimated impact on annual earnings increases over time 
(though the end of the period is less precisely estimated). These results could 
have several explanations. First, fathers are a positively selected group even 
within a twin pair. Second, becoming a father improves productivity if, within a 
family, the father specialises in market work, while the mother allocates more 
time to housework and children. Third, it can be that fathers work more hours 
than childless men. However, since the estimated impact is the strongest after 
1990 (although the estimation becomes less precise), this indicates that the 1990s 
recession has had a different impact on fathers and non-fathers. The estimated 
impact is similar when the outcome is annual income (Figure 8).   
                                              
 
20 Between years 1970 and 1990 earnings and income are observed only every 5th year. 
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4. Conclusions   
I find that the lifetime cost of children is nonlinear in nature. The first child has a 
positive and economically large impact on lifetime earnings and income around 
30 to 40% for both males and females. This finding can be explained in various 
alternative hypotheses. First, the child-premium might reflect some form of 
selection – even within a twin pair. Those without children may be a negatively 
selected group of individuals. In other words, persons who have experienced an 
individual specific shock – for example a health shock – in their lives, which 
prevents them from making both children and money. Equally, having child can 
be a positive “shock” to one's health. Second, it might be that having a child 
really improves productivity – whether it is due to parenthood changing one’s 
personality or use of time. Third, having a family could be a signal of 
responsibility, commitment, prestige, etc. – things that are valued by the 
employer. Fourth, becoming a parent sets demands on family economy – for 
example, a larger house is often needed – which in turn is reflected in one's labor 
market choices and performance. Becoming a parent might also change the 
preferences on lifestyle – for example a larger house is often preferred, if not 
needed. Last, a child premium may be explained by the so-called in-group bias, 
meaning that people have a tendency to favor their own kind and are more 
altruistic toward others in their own group. When considering the cohorts of this 
study, individuals born between 1944 and 1950, being a parent has been the 
social norm. One explanation could also be institutionally based. In some 
manufacturing industries the employee contracts require that when employers 
need to lay off workers for productive reasons, they first have to lay off workers 
with the least tenure and no children. These industries are male-dominated, 
which might explain the high “father premium” after the deep recession in the 
early 1990s.    
This study cannot determine which of the above-mentioned reasons is the main 
explanation for the “parent premium” in lifetime earnings and income. However, 
one of the main explanations seems to be health: childless women receive 
disability pension more than twice as often as mothers, and childless men receive 
disability pension three times as often as fathers in 2004. It seems that the worse 
development in health indicators of childless individuals in 1981 and 1990 have 
continued after the 1990s recession. It is unclear what role the 1990s recession 
had in this.   
The evidence of the effect of children on lifetime labor earnings of this study 
states that the motherhood wage penalty in earnings is only temporary in nature. 
This result supports the findings of earlier research on wage dynamics around 
childbirth in the Finnish labor markets. Napari (2010) found that there is a 
motherhood wage penalty for the first child in the years following childbirth in 
the Finnish private sector, but these wage penalties of first-time mothers decrease 
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after the return to employment. This study has shown that there is no permanent 
loss in earnings due to children. On the contrary, being a parent seems to benefit 
workers in terms of their earnings. Though, the size of this effect is a somewhat 
puzzling finding. The channels of this “parent premium” in lifetime labor 
earnings remain to be solved by future research.     
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The Effect of Job Displacement on Couples’ Fertility 
Decisions 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using Finnish 
longitudinal register data. We focus on couples where one spouse has lost her job 
due to a plant closure and follow them for several years before and following the 
job loss. The results show that female job loss decreases fertility. For every 100 
displaced females there are 3 less children born. Male job loss has no impact on 
fertility despite resulting in a stronger decrease in family income than female job 
loss. This indicates that the income effect is not the mechanism through which 
job displacement influences fertility. 
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1. Introduction  
The question of how income affects people’s fertility behavior has interested 
economists for decades. The evidence points in various directions. Cross 
sectional studies suggest that family size is negatively related to household 
income, while studies investigating changes in aggregate wages or 
unemployment find that better economic conditions increase the demand for 
children. The literature suffers from various challenges. A household’s income 
and fertility tend to be jointly determined, which makes it difficult to disentangle 
the causal mechanism between income and fertility. Some studies have focused 
on exogenous changes in aggregate income in order to mitigate the problems of 
reverse causality (Black et al. 2013, Schultz, 1985). The use of aggregate 
measures may however hide important heterogeneity in responses. According to 
the standard economic theory of fertility, the distinction between male and 
female income is crucial, since women are assumed to be more likely the ones 
that take time off from work to participate in the care of young children.  
This article examines the effect of job loss that is due to plant closure on a 
couple’s fertility behavior. A plant closure can be thought of as an exogenous 
shock to a worker’s career since it results in a separation of all plant’s workers 
and it is not related to the worker’s own job performance. Several studies have 
documented that displaced workers suffer from long lasting earnings losses 
(Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993, Eliason and Storrie, 2006, Couch and 
Placzek, 2010, Huttunen, Møen, and Salvanes, 2011). Thus we can use plant 
closures to explore the causal effect of male and female income shocks on 
fertility behavior at the micro-level.  
We acknowledge that a job loss can have an indirect effect on a couple’s fertility 
decisions through mechanism other than income changes. The career interruption 
itself may affect fertility since it increases uncertainty concerning future 
employment conditions and job instability (Stevens 1997, 2001, Farber 2007). 
Job displacement can also influence fertility behavior through several non-
economic outcomes, such as divorce probability (Charles and Stephens 2004, 
Eliason 2012) and health (Martikainen, Mäki and Jäntti, 2007, and Sullivan and 
von Wachter, 2009). In order to make distinction between these alternative 
channels we investigate the effect of job loss on various outcomes, such as 
earnings, family income, employment, spouse’s employment, employment 
stability and divorce. 
We use Finnish longitudinal employer-employee data (FLEED) matched to birth 
records to analyze the effect of a job loss on fertility. The data consist of all  
16–70 year old Finnish residents from 1988 to 2004. Each worker and their 
employer in these data have a unique identification code. In addition, information 
on workers’ spouses is included, which makes it possible to create a sample of 
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(cohabiting or married) couples.1 We focus on couples where one spouse lost 
his/her job due to a plant closure in the years 1991–1993. As a comparison group 
we use similar couples who were not affected by a plant closure. We follow each 
couple for 4 years before a job loss and for 11 years after a job loss in order to 
investigate the changes in their fertility over the period.  
This paper makes several contributions both to family economics and to literature 
that examines the impacts of job displacements. First, we can distinguish 
between a woman’s own and her spouse’s job loss, and thus make a distinction 
between a shock to the woman’s career and an income shock generated by man’s 
job loss. Previous studies have either focused on the effect of a woman’s own job 
loss (Del Bono, Weber and Winter-Ebmer, 2012) or the effect of a husband’s job 
loss (Lindo 2010) on fertility. Second, the long time span allows us to distinguish 
between the effect on fertility postponement and completed fertility, and analyze 
the effect on various long-term outcomes, such as permanent family income. 
Finally, in addition to comparing responses by spouses, the rich data allow us to 
examine the heterogeneity of responses by various other observational 
dimensions such as education, tenure, spouse’s education etc. We use our 
theoretical framework to interpret how the effect of job displacement on fertility 
may vary by worker characteristics.  
The results show that a woman’s job loss decreases fertility, and the effect is 
strongest for highly educated women. For every 100 displaced highly educated 
females there are 5 less children born. Despite the larger reduction in permanent 
income (-3.63% versus -2.72%), male job loss has much weaker effect on 
fertility than female job loss. The only groups for which we find significant 
responses after male job loss are the couples in which women are well attached to 
labor market and couples with the largest estimated income loss: the low 
educated high tenure males. This suggests that the income effect is not the main 
mechanism through which job loss influences couples’ fertility behavior. Career 
concerns, especially in the case of highly educated women, seem to be a much 
more important determinant. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief theoretical 
background and gives an overview of the existing literature. In the third section 
we describe the data, institutions and provide some descriptive evidence. The 
forth section outlines the empirical set up, presents the results and summarizes 
the implications of our estimates. The final section concludes. 
 
                                              
 
1 We use the word ”spouse” to mean both spouses in married couples and partners in unmarried 
cohabiting couples. Cohabitation (before marriage) is common in Finland. 
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-0.38. As stated in review by the Hotz at al. (1993) the key challenge in the 
empirical literature on fertility is how to obtain exogenous variation in 
households’ income and in the prices of children. Earlier studies either ignored 
this or, as Heckman and Walker (1990), used aggregate wages to mitigate the 
problems of reversed causality. Their results indicate that rising female wages 
delay and reduce overall fertility, while male wages have at most a small positive 
effect on fertility. 
The previous attempts to estimate a causal effect of income changes on fertility 
behavior have exploited exogenous variation in aggregate female and male wages 
stemming from some exogenous shocks. Schultz (1985) uses exogenous 
variation in relative female and male wages arising from the changes in world 
price of butter relative to world price of grains in Sweden in the early 20th 
century. Since dairy and milk processing were “women’s work” in Sweden, the 
relative increase in world price of butter increased the female wages relative to 
male wages. Schultz shows that increase in female relative wages decreased 
fertility, while increases in real male wages had no effect total fertility. Black et 
al. (2013) use the exogenous shocks to men’s income in coal counties in the US 
that was caused by the coal boom in 1970’s to investigate the causal effect of 
income on fertility. They findings suggest that a 10% increase in income 
increased fertility by 7%. Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) investigate the effect 
of family’s life time wealth on fertility. They exploit the variation in housing 
prices in the US caused by the housing boom that began in the late 1990’s and 
affected differentially housing prices across different locations. They find that 
short-run increases in one’s home value are associated with an increase in the 
probability of having a child, suggesting a housing wealth elasticity of fertility of 
0.13. 
There have been much fewer attempts to investigate the effects of employment 
and earnings shocks on fertility behavior at the micro-level. Lindo (2010) uses 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine the effect of male job 
loss on fertility. He finds that male job loss increases fertility in the years 
immediately after job loss, but the effect becomes negative for the years 3 to 8 
after job loss. The total effect on fertility by the 8th year is negative, although not 
statistically significant when individual fixed effects are included in the model. 
The estimated effect of male job loss on annual earnings by 8th year since job loss 
is around -31.6%, which together with the 4.8% reduction in total fertility in post 
displacement years implies an income elasticity of 0.15.  
Del Bono et al. (2012) examine the effects of a woman’s own job loss using 
Austrian data from 1972–2002. Comparing the birth rates of displaced women 
with those unaffected by job losses they find that job displacement reduces 
average fertility by 5 to 10% in the short and medium term (9 year after job loss). 
The strong average response is mainly explained by the behavior of white collar 
women. Although the study focuses on women, they also use as a robustness 
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check a small subsample of men, in order to examine how male job loss 
influences fertility behavior. Male job loss decreases fertility, although the point 
estimates are slightly smaller than those for females. Their interpretation is that it 
is not only the loss of income that causes fertility to decline but the career 
interruption that occurs due to the displacement.2  
Another branch of the literature has investigated how fertility responds to 
downturns and high unemployment3. Most of these studies in both demographics 
and economics support the idea that fertility is procyclical, since there is a clear 
negative relationship between aggregate unemployment and fertility (Sobotka, 
Skirbekk and Philipov, 2011, Ahn and Mira, 2001, Adsera, 2005). Dehejia and 
Lleras-Muney (2004) study the relationship between unemployment rate and 
selection into motherhood. They find that the fertility response to temporary 
shocks in income differs substantially by socioeconomic status and by race in the 
US. They argue that this reflects the fact that women who are more likely to be 
credit constrained (low educated black women) have an incentive to postpone 
childbearing when the unemployment rate is high, while not credit constrained 
low skilled women (low educated white women) tend to increase fertility in 
recessions. 
Overall, there are relatively few studies which have examined how career shocks 
or income shocks affect fertility at micro-level. The previous attempts to analyze 
causal effect of income on fertility have either focused on changes in aggregate 
wages or on short-term responses. The previous studies that have examined the 
effect of job displacement on fertility have either focused on male or female job 
displacement, and have not investigated the effects on long-term outcomes of 
both spouses, such as permanent family income, joint employment decisions or 
divorce. 
                                              
 
2 Del Bono et al. (2012) provide descriptive evidence showing that there is a significant gap in quarterly 
earnings of displaced women and the comparison group in the first three years after job loss, but cannot 
follow earnings in time.  
3 There also exist studies that have examined how government transfer policies and subsidies causing 
exogenous changes in the price of children affect household’s fertility decisions. Milligan (2005) and 
Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2013) find that child subsidies have a positive effect on fertility. 
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We then divide workers into displaced and non-displaced workers using plant 
closure definition in year t. A plant is a closing plant in year t if it is in the entire 
register data in year t but it is no longer there in year t +1 or in any of the years 
after t +1. To make sure these are real closures we define those exiting plants for 
which more than 70% of the workforce is working in a single new plant in the 
following year as not a real closures. A displaced worker is a worker who was 
separated between t and t + 1 from a plant that closed down during this time. In 
addition, we take so called early-leavers i.e. workers who left between t and t + 1 
from plants that closed down between t + 1 and t + 2 and which reduced their 
size more than 30% between t and t + 1. As a robustness check we also use an 
alternative definition of job displacement: a job loss that results from a mass 
layoff event. This means that a worker is labeled as displaced in year t, if she 
separated between t and t + 1 a plant that downsizes more than 30% between t 
and t + 1. Since small plants are much more likely to have relatively large 
employment fluctuations, we follow the previous literature and take workers in 
plants with more than 50 (and less than 2500) workers in base year t when using 
this job displacement definition. 
After having defined a worker’s displacement status in base year t, we follow 
each worker and his spouse 3 years before a possible job loss, until the 11th after 
a job loss. Our main base years are 1991–19935, and we follow workers form 
these years using the data covering 1988–2004. The construction of the sample 
allows us to use the rich information on the pre-displacement period to construct 
the pre-displacement comparability between those who were affected by the plant 
closure (treatment group) and those who were not (comparison group).6 We 
investigate differences in several outcomes using all pre-and post-displacement 
years. Employment is an indicator variable that gets the value one if a worker’s 
employment status is “employed”. Annual earnings are measured as annual 
taxable labor income in year t. We also use another income measure, annual 
taxable income, which includes also transfers such as unemployment and 
parental benefits. It is important to make a distinction between these two 
measures, since in Finland the level of both unemployment insurance and 
parental benefits is relatively high. Family income is constructed by adding up 
both spouses’ total taxable income (including transfers). Divorce status is defined 
using spouse codes. A worker is labeled as divorced if she no longer has the 
same spouse as in base year t. We use two different measures for fertility: an 
indicator variable that woman has given birth in the current year and the total 
number of children.  
                                              
 
5 To investigate the robustness of the results to different business cycle conditions we also redo the 
analysis for recovery years 1996-1998. 
6 Following most recent studies, the comparison group consists of both stayers as well as workers who 
separated voluntarily or due to illness etc.  
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Females Males  
 Displaced Non-displaced P  value for 
difference 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
P  value for 
difference 
Age 32.49 32.46 .58 34.53 34.68 .01
Primary .24 .25 .95 .21 .22 .15 
Secondary .42 .43 .15 .44 .46 .00 
Tertiary .33 .32 .11 .35 .32 .00 
Experience 11.81 11.72 .30 11.57 11.92 .00 
Tenure 6.17 6.26 .18 6.80 8.02 .00 
Plant size 58.89 120.13 .00 63.95 149.14 .00 
Annual earnings (in 1000 euros) 18.56 18.65 .31 26.97 27.00 .80 
Annual earnings at t-3 14.91 14.94 .75 24.32 24.30 .89 
Spouse's earnings 18.09 18.14 .74 11.84 11.69 .06 
Annual income (inc. transfers)  18.87 18.91 .58 27.21 27.27 .60 
Family Income  41.01 41.20 .35 41.51 41.60 .55 
Spouse employed .82 .82 .81 0.76 .74 .00 
Spouse displaced .07 .02 .00 0.05 0.01 .00 
Spouse same plant .05 .06 .00 .03 .04 .00 
Married .67 .66 .55 0.72 .73 .08 
Number of children at t-4 .94 .92 .09 0.99 1.00 .30 
Number of children  1.12 1.10 .27 1.35 1.37 .12 
Agriculture .00 .01 .00 .01 .01 .00 
Mining  .00 .00 .32   .00 .01 .12 
Manufacturing .28 .30 .00 .38 .45 .00 
Electricity. gas and water .00 .00  - .01 .03 .00 
Construction .05 .01 .00 .15 .06 .00 
Wholesale and retail trade .23 .24 .24 .21 .18 .00 
Accommodation. food services .07 .07 .17 .02 .02 .10 
Transportation and storage .03 .04 .00 .05 .08 .00 
Finance .17 .12 .00 .04 .03 .00 
Real estate activities .14 .11  .00 .12 .09 .00 
Health and social work  .02 .06 .00 .00 .01 .00   
Other services .02 .04 .00  .02 .04 .00    
Observations 7,011 249,894  11,143 373,588  
NOTE: Sample consist of women (men) who were 20–40 (20–50) years old at the time t (base years  
1991–1993), who were working in private sector plants with at least one year of tenure and who did not 
give birth during year t.  
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To illustrate the shock created by job displacement we follow both displaced and 
non-displaced workers several years before and after job loss and report the 
average annual earnings (including zeros) for these groups in upper panel of 
figure 1. The earnings of the two groups are very similar before job loss, which 
indicates that job displacement was an exogenous shock to these workers. Job 
displacement reduces the earnings of displaced workers and opens up a 
significant earnings gap between displaced and non-displaced workers. In line 
with previous findings the earnings difference between the displaced and the 
non-displaced begins a couple of years before the job loss occurs.  One obvious 
reason for a big drop in annual earnings is the loss of earnings that is due to non-
employment. The lower panel of figure 1 shows the share of employed workers 
among displaced and non-displaced workers in years preceding and succeeding 
job loss. In the first year after job displacement there is a significant drop in the 
employment level of displaced workers. Of workers who are displaced in plant 
closures 67% are re-employed by the following year. There is an important drop 
in the employment rate of the comparison group as well, especially in the female 
sample. It is important to remember that these workers were displaced during a 
very severe recession, which explains the relatively low re-employment rate 
compared to previous studies.  
Figure 1.  Annual earnings (A) and employment share (B) by displacement 
status. 
 
NOTE: Solid lines describe the outcome of displaced workers. Dotted line is the outcome of non-displaced 
workers. 
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In upper panel of figure 2 we report the birth rates of displaced and non-displaced 
worker groups. Female displaced workers are less likely to give birth in years 
around the job loss event than non-displaced workers.9 We see no difference in 
birth rates between displaced and non-displaced male workers. In the lower panel 
we report the number of children for the displaced and non-displaced group.10 
Displaced women have slightly more children than non-displaced women in the 
years preceding job loss as shown also in table 1. This difference in the number 
of children diminishes and becomes negative over time. For males, displaced 
workers have fewer children throughout the period, but the difference is not 
significant. There is no change in the difference in number of children after job 
loss. Next we investigate in a regression framework the effect of job 
displacement when comparing similar workers within same industries. 
Figure 2.  Share of giving birth (A) and cumulative number of children (B) 
by displacement status 
 
NOTE: Solid lines describe the outcome of displaced workers. Dotted line is the outcome of non-displaced 
workers. 
 
                                              
 
9 Note that we exclude workers who gave birth in year t. 
10 The birth information is linked to males using the base year spouse’s id codes.  
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year displaced women have 1.2 % lower family income and males 2.2% lower 
family income than similar comparison group workers. The fixed effects 
specification gives similar results, but slightly stronger results. The estimate 
second year effect is -5.3% (-2 240 euros) for females and -7.9% for males  
(-3 400 euros). 
Figure 3. Effect of job displacement on annual earnings: without individual 
fixed effects (A) and with individual fixed effects (B) 
 
NOTE: 90% confidence intervals are obtained by clustering standard errors on individuals. Sample 
consists of women who were 20–40 years old at time 0 (base years 1991–1993), who were working in the 
end of the year 0 and -1 and who did not give birth during year 0. The additional control variables in 
specification without individual fixed effects are: worker’s age at the time of displacement, age squared, a 
dummy for education level (6 categories), a dummy for education field (10 categories), pre-displacement 
years of tenure, tenure squared, pre-displacement marital status, spouse’s employment status in base year, 
spouse’s earnings in base year, spouse’s age and age squared, the number of children four years before job 
loss, pre-displacement plant size, pre-displacement region (21 categories) and industry dummies (10 
categories), and time dummy*base year  dummy interactions. In fixed effects specifications the controls are 
time dummy*base year dummy interactions, age, age squared and spouse’s age and spouse’s age squared. 
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Figure 4.  Effect of job displacement on annual family income without 
individual fixed effects (above) and with individual fixed effects 
(below) 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals are obtained by clustering standard errors on individuals. Sample consists 
of women who were 20–40 years old at time 0 (base years 1991–1993), who were working in the end of the 
year 0 and -1 and who did not give birth during year 0. The additional control variables are reported 
under figure 4. 
 
Next we estimate the effect of job displacement on permanent income. Following 
Davis and von Wachter (2011) we calculate the estimated present discounted 
value (PDV) earnings losses as 
 
 
where sδ  is the estimated effect of earnings loss for period s after job 
displacement. We calculate the present value of earnings loss 25 years after job 
displacement, and assume that the losses after the 11th year (the last period that 
we observe) decay with similar rate λ  as between years 10 and 11.14 The 
percentage effect of the PDV earnings loss is obtained by dividing the PDV of 
                                              
 
14 The rate of decay that we use is 0.009 which the rate at which the effect of job displacement on 
earnings decreases for males between year 10 and 11.  
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earnings loss with PDV of counterfactual earnings in the absence of 
displacement. The counterfactual earnings path is obtained by adding the value of 
the estimated earnings loss from fixed effects specification back to average level 
of earnings for displaced group each period. Since workers are on average 45 
years old at year 11, and the earnings growth of over 45 year old workers is 
relatively stable, we assume that earnings stay at the same level from year 11 
until year 25.  
The estimated PDV earnings and family income losses using 3% interest rate, r, 
are reported in table 2. Female job loss decreases the present value of future 
earnings by 27 904 euros which corresponds to a -7.72 percent loss on PDV 
earnings. The effect of male job loss on PDV earnings is higher both in absolute 
terms (-54 967 euros) and in percentages (-10%). The effect of female job loss on 
PDV family income (including transfers) is 2.72 % and the effect of male job 
loss is 3.63%. 
Previous research suggests that earnings losses after job displacement differ by 
pre-displacement tenure (e.g. Topel, 1990) and education (von Wachter and 
Weber Handwerker, 2010). For this reason we split the sample by pre-
displacement tenure and education and report the permanent income losses for 
these groups in table 2.15 The corresponding year by year effects of job 
displacement on annual earnings and family income for each group are reported 
in table A2. In line with previous research, we find that the income losses are 
largest for low educated workers and for workers with high pre-displacement 
tenure.16 The group that has highest permanent income losses after job loss is low 
educated high tenure workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
15 Low educated refers to group with basic or lower secondary education (max12 years of schooling). 
High educated have upper secondary degree, such as college degree (more than 12 years). Low tenure 
means less and high tenure more than 3 years of pre-displacement tenure. 
16 The effect of job displacement on PDV family income for low and highly educated females are larger 
than the effect for all, although the not discounted cumulative effect for years 1 to 11 is for all females  
(-3.5%) lies between the effect of low (-4.37%) and high educated groups (.-3.22%). The PDV effects 
puts more weight to estimates that are closer to period t.   
  
Tabl
 
Presen
value 
 
All 
Low e
High 
Low e
Low e
High 
High 
NOTE
rate. T
in the
more 
 
 T4.3
To e
estim
displ
plott
child
cont
betw
displ
persi
100 
after
loss.
seem
no si
plan
Tabl
effec
year
we 
displ
likel
       
 
17 We
18 The
outcom
e 2.  
t discounted 
of loss 
ducated 
educated 
d. low tenure
d high ten 
ed. low ten 
ed. high ten 
: % loss is cal
he counterfac
 current year t
than lower  se
he Effec
xamine ho
ate the ef
acement y
ed in figu
ren by the
rol variabl
een displa
acement 
stent and 
couples w
 job loss, t
 This corr
s to have 
gnificant d
t closures a
e 3 also p
t of femal
. Similar t
find that 
acement.1
y to give
                 
 also estimate
 reason for sm
e variable d
The perce
family inc
Own ea
Female j
Euro
value
-27,90
-32,42
-24,45
 -26,15
-35,04
-15,83
-32,18
culated as the
tual earnings
o which the f
condary degr
t of Job D
w a woma
fect on a 
ears. The
re 5 and 
 end of th
e in order 
ced and no
decreases 
leads to a
ith a displ
han what 
esponds to
no effect o
ifference 
nd not-dis
resents res
e job displ
o the resu
displaced
8 Women 
 birth wit
                 
d the model w
aller numbe
oes not vary. 
ntage loss
ome 
rnings 
ob loss 
 
 
% 
4 -7.72
5 -10.33
7 -5.32
7 -9.20
1 -10.31
4 -3.69
1 -6.67
 percentage o
 for each perio
e-estimate of t
ee and low te
isplacem
n’s own or
cumulative
 estimated
in table 3
e year. W
to take ac
n-displace
fertility 
 significan
aced wom
there woul
 a 1.8% d
n fertility 
in fertility
placed ma
ults from 
acement o
lts of the r
 women 
who have 
hin a yea
     
ith individua
r of observati
The linear pro
71 
 in cumula
Male job lo
Euro 
value 
-54,967
-62,167
-63,697
-42,915
-68,153
-62,047
-64,075
f PDV of coun
d are calcula
he average ea
nure workers
ent on F
 her spous
 number 
 coefficie
. The dep
e use the 
count of th
d.17 Resul
immediate
t differenc
an, 3 chil
d have be
ecrease in
postponem
 between m
les.  
an alterna
n the prob
egression 
are less
lost their 
r from jo
l fixed effects
on is that we
bability mod
tive and P
ss 
% 
-10.00 
-13.51 
-8.63 
-10.06 
-14.36 
-8.69 
-8.51 
terfactual ear
ted as average
rnings loss is
 have three ye
ertility 
e’s job los
of children
nts on di
endent va
number of
e permane
ts indicate
ly after j
e in comp
dren less a
en in the a
 fertility. I
ent or com
ale work
tive specif
ability of g
on cumula
 likely t
job in pla
b displace
 and results a
 cannot estim
el using all ye
DV perma
Family Incom
Female job lo
Euro  
value 
-24,324 
-25,128 
-33,286 
-16,978 
-30,162 
-32,151 
-33,421 
nings (income
 earnings of d
 added. Low e
ars of tenure 
s affects fe
 using all
splacemen
riable is 
 children i
nt differen
 that a wo
ob loss. 
leted ferti
re born b
bsence of 
n contrast
pleted fe
ers that we
ication tha
iving birth
tive numb
o give b
nt closures
ment than
re reported in
ate the effect 
ars is reporte
nent own 
e 
ss Ma
% 
-2.72 -
-3.13 -
-3.06 -
-2.19 -
-3.66 -
-3.02 -
-3.04 -
) using 3% in
isplaced wor
ducated have
at maximum.
rtility, we
 pre- and 
t variable
the numb
n year t-4
ces in fer
man’s ow
The effe
lity. For e
y the 11th 
a woman’
, male job
rtility. The
re displac
t estimate
 in the cu
er of chil
irth after
 are 0.4%
 similar 
 appendix b. 
for years whe
d in appendix
and 
le job loss 
Euro 
value 
33,464 -3
40,679 -5
47,784 -4
24,451 -3
47,375 -10
39,570 -5
54,422 -7
terest 
kers 
 no 
 
 first 
post-
s are 
er of 
 as a 
tility 
n job 
ct is 
very 
year 
s job 
 loss 
re is 
ed in 
s the 
rrent 
dren, 
 job 
 less 
non-
n  the 
.  
% 
.63 
.04 
.12 
.13 
.45 
.73 
.33 
72 
 
 
displaced women. This represents a 4% decrease in probability to give birth since 
the average non-displaced worker has a 10% probability of giving birth during 
this period. This postponement seems to correspond to effect on the completed 
fertility as shown in column 1. Male job loss does not affect the probability of 
their partner giving birth. 
Figure 5.  Effect of job displacement on cumulative number of children 
 
Note: Sample consists of women (men) who were 20–40 (20–50) years old at time 0 (base years 1991–1993), 
who were working in the end of the year 0 and -1 and who did not give birth during year 0 and who were 
married or cohabiting in year 0. The additional control variables are: full set of worker’s age dummies, a 
dummy for education level (6 categories), a dummy for education field (10 categories), pre-displacement 
years of tenure, tenure squared, pre-displacement marital status, spouse’s employment status in base year, 
spouse’s earnings in base year, full set of spouse’s age dummies, the number of children four years before 
job loss, pre-displacement plant size, pre-displacement region (21 categories) and 2-digit-predisplacement-
industry dummies, and time dummies*base year dummies interactions. 90% confidence intervals are 
obtained by clustering standard errors on individuals. 
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Table 3. Effect of job displacement on fertility 
Effect by years 
since 
displacement 
At least one spouse employed at t Both spouses employed at t 
Female Job Loss Male Job Loss Female Job Loss Male Job Loss 
Number 
of 
children 
Gave 
birth 
Number 
of 
children
Gave 
birth 
Number 
of 
children
Gave 
birth 
Number 
of 
children 
Gave birth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dpl_3 .000 -.001 .003 .001 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 
 (.004) (.001) (.004) (.001) (.005) (.002) (.004) (.002) 
dpl_2 -.004 -.002* -.003 -.002* -.004 -.002 -.005 -.001 
 (.005) (.001) (.005) (.001) (.006) (.002) (.005) (.002) 
dpl_1 -.000 .001 -.001 .001 -.003 .000 -.002 .002 
 (.005) (.001) (.005) (.001) (.007) (.002) (.006) (.002) 
dpl_0 .000  -.002 -.002 -.005  
 (.005)  (.005) (.007) (.006)  
dpl1 -.014** -.004*** -.002 .000 -.018** -.005*** -.006 -.000 
 (.006) (.001) (.006) (.001) (.009) (.002) (.008) (.001) 
dpl2 -.014* .000 -.003 -.001 -.016* .001 -.004 .000 
 (.007) (.001) (.007) (.001) (.010) (.002) (.008) (.002) 
dpl3 -.014* .000 -.004 -.001 -.015 .001 -.009 -.002 
 (.008) (.001) (.007) (.001) (.011) (.002) (.009) (.002) 
dpl4 -.023*** -.003*** -.005 -.000 -.025** -.004* -.009 .001 
 (.008) (.001) (.007) (.001) (.011) (.002) (.010) (.002) 
dpl5 -.024*** -.001 -.005 -.001 -.019 .002 -.013 -.003 
 (.009) (.001) (.008) (.001) (.012) (.002) (.010) (.002) 
dpl6 -.026*** -.002 -.006 -.000 -.020 -.000 -.014 .000 
 (.009) (.002) (.008) (.001) (.012) (.002) (.010) (.002) 
dpl7 -.029*** -.002 -.004 .002 -.021 .001 -.014 .000 
 (.009) (.002) (.008) (.002) (.013) (.003) (.011) (.002) 
dpl8 -.032*** -.001 -.004 -.000 -.020 .002 -.015 -.002 
 (.009) (.002) (.008) (.002) (.013) (.003) (.011) (.002) 
dpl9 -.030*** .002 -.004 .001 -.017 .003 -.015 -.000 
 (.009) (.002) (.008) (.002) (.013) (.003) (.011) (.002) 
dpl10 -.029*** .001 -.007 -.002 -.017 .001 -.017 -.004* 
 (.010) (.002) (.008) (.002) (.013) (.003) (.011) (.002) 
dpl11 -.031*** .001 -.007 -.002 -.015 -.000 -.020* -.002 
 (.010) (.002) (.009) (.002) (.015) (.004) (.012) (.003) 
Observations 3,800,222 3,446,543 5,698,233 5,289,862 1,924,981 1,706,471 1,924,981 1,706,471 
NOTE: OLS coefficients or marginal effects of probit regression in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. Robust standard 
errors clustered on individuals are in parenthesis. The years when outcome variable does not vary (e.g. all 
are employed in years t – 1 and t) are dropped from the regression, which explains why the number of 
observations varies between columns. Sample consists of women who were 20–40 years old at time t (base 
years 1991–1993), who were working in the end of the year t and t – 1 and who did not give birth during 
year t. 
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In the regressions reported in columns 1–4 we have different samples when 
analyzing the effects of female and male job losses. In the female job loss 
sample, we have couples where women were employed in year t, and in the male 
job loss sample, all men were employed in year t. These couples may be very 
different if, for example, couples with non-working mothers react differently to 
changes in income than working mothers. In order to better compare the effects 
of female and male job losses, we restrict the analysis to couples where both 
spouses were employed in year t and estimate a model where we include 
dummies for both spouse’s displacement status. These results are reported in 
columns 5–8. Now there seems to be no pre-displacement differences in the 
likelihood for giving birth, but the immediate effect on the probability to give 
birth in the year following female job loss is now bigger, 0.005. Male job loss 
has no immediate effect on fertility, but results to a small reduction in completed 
number of children in the long run for this sample. This indicates that in couples 
where women are well attached to labor market, male job loss may also influence 
fertility. 
As argued in section 2 there may be a number of reasons why the effect of job 
displacement on fertility may differ between skill groups. Figure 6 presents the 
results where we have split the sample into two groups by education. We find 
that there is an important heterogeneity in the effect of job displacement on 
fertility. The effect of job loss is much stronger for highly educated women. The 
effect remains until the end of the study period. By the 11th post displacement 
year there are 0.045 less children born for displaced highly educated women than 
for similar non-displaced women. Highly educated women postpone births after 
job loss, which corresponds to a 2.6% reduction in completed fertility.19 When 
studying how the effect of male job loss varies between highly and low educated 
males, there seems to be no differences in the response. For both groups male job 
displacement does not affect fertility. However, when examining how the 
responses by male job loss vary by woman’s education in the sample of 
employed couple’s (Figure 7), we find that couples with highly educated 
employed females react to both male and female job losses.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
19 We also examined how the effect varies by pre-displacement wage and the share of a worker’s earnings 
of the total family income (appendix B). A woman’s job loss reduces the fertility more strongly for high-
wage women and for women in households where the husband’s share of household income is low. 
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Figure 6.  Effect of female job displacement on fertility by education 
 
Notes: See text under figure 5. 
 
Figure 7.  Effect of female job displacement on fertility by female education 
in sample of employed couples  
 
Notes: See text under figure 5. 
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In the previous section we documented that the income loss resulting from a job 
displacement is highest for low educated workers with high pre-displacement job 
tenure. To investigate how these income changes are associated with fertility 
changes we now investigate how the fertility effects differ by pre-displacement 
tenure and education. We calculate the corresponding income elasticity of 
fertility using the PDV estimates from table 2. Table 4 shows that the strongest 
reaction from a female job loss on fertility is from highly educated high tenure 
women (3.3%). The corresponding income loss is however the smallest one as 
shown in table 2. In contrast, the only significant effect of male job loss on 
fertility is for the group for which the associated PDV income loss is largest: 
high tenure low educated males. For this group male job displacement reduces 
fertility by 1.4%. The estimated fertility effects are smaller than found by Del 
Bono et al. (2012) and Lindo (2010), who find that female job loss reduced 
fertility by 5-10% and male job loss by 4.8%.  If we assume that the job loss for 
males works mainly through the income effect, we can calculate that the 
estimated own earnings elasticity for fertility is 0.10 and family income elasticity 
is 0.14. The own income elasticity for this group is smaller than the average 
elasticity reported by Lindo (0.015). When calculating the income elasticity of 
fertility, it is important to bear in mind that job displacement may influence 
income also through some indirect mechanism (even through fertility changes), 
and fertility may be influenced through other channels than income changes.  
These results indicate that explanations other than the income effect, such as 
career concerns, seem to be a much more important determinant after female job 
loss. We analyze the alternative channels more specifically in next section. 
Table 4.  Effect of job displacement on cumulative number of children and 
permanent income elasticity 
 Female Job Loss Male Job Loss 
 Effect % Own 
earnings 
elasticity 
Family 
income 
elasticity 
Effect % Own 
earnings 
elasticity 
Family 
income 
elasticity 
All -.031* -1.76 .23 .65 -.007 -.36 .04 .10 
Low educated -.026* -1.54 .15 .49 -.016 -.84 .06 .17 
High educated -.045* -2.61 .49 .85 .000 .02 -.00 -.00 
Low ed. low tenure -.021 -1.17 .13 .54 -.002 -.13 .01 .04 
Low ed high ten -.032* -1.99 .19 .54 -.027* -1.44 .10 .14 
High ed. low ten -.025* -1.43 .39 .47 -.027 -1.38 .16 .24 
High ed. high ten -.057* -3.31 .50 1.09 .015 .72 .16 -.10 
NOTE: The effect is the estimated effect of job displacement on cumulative number of children by 11the 
post-displacement year. The percentage % is the effect related to comparison group mean in the 11th year. 
The elasticity is calculated using the percentage loss in PDV of permanent own earnings and family 
income that is reported in table 2. * means that the estimate is significant at 10% level.  
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Table 5. Effect of job displacement on alternative outcomes 
 Female jobs loss Male job loss 
Effect by years 
since 
displacement 
Employed Post 
displacement 
tenure 
Spouse 
employed 
Divorced Employed Post 
displacement 
tenure 
Spouse 
employed 
Divorced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dpl_3 .005  .007* .005*** -.003 
 (.003)  (.004)  (.002)  (.004)  
dpl_2 .005  -.003  .001  -.004  
 (.004)  (.004)  (.003)  (.004)  
dpl_1   -.003 -.000   -.004 .003 
   (.004) (.006)   (.004) (.004) 
dpl_0   -.004    .003  
   (.003)    (.003)  
dpl1 -.288***  -.015*** .003 -.236***  -.014*** .011** 
 (.006)  (.004) (.006) (.005)  (.004) (.005) 
dpl2 -.151*** -.003 -.011*** -.002 -.120*** .075*** -.005 .007* 
 (.005) (.011) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.010) (.004) (.004) 
dpl3 -.095*** -.170*** -.004 .001 -.076*** -.073*** -.005 .004 
 (.004) (.016) (.004) (.005) (.003) (.013) (.004) (.004) 
dpl4 -.076*** -.299*** -.010** .004 -.054*** -.217*** -.004 .006* 
 (.004) (.022) (.004) (.005) (.003) (.018) (.004) (.003) 
dpl5 -.050*** -.442*** -.010** .005 -.038*** -.409*** -.000 .006* 
 (.004) (.027) (.004) (.005) (.003) (.022) (.004) (.003) 
dpl6 -.040*** -.589*** -.004 .004 -.026*** -.551*** .002 .007** 
 (.004) (.032) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.026) (.004) (.003) 
dpl7 -.029*** -.723*** -.008** .005 -.018*** -.605*** .006 .005* 
 (.004) (.037) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.030) (.004) (.003) 
dpl8 -.025*** -.834*** -.011*** .005 -.016*** -.677*** .003 .005* 
 (.004) (.042) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.034) (.004) (.003) 
dpl9 -.016*** -.863*** -.008* .002 -.008*** -.711*** .001 .006* 
 (.003) (.046) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.038) (.004) (.003) 
dpl10 -.011*** -.877*** -.006 .005 -.011*** -.788*** .003 .004 
 (.003) (.051) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.042) (.004) (.003) 
dpl11 -.003 -.892*** -.003 .006 -.007*** -.836*** -.003 .004 
 (.003) (.057) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.046) (.004) (.003) 
Observations 3,544,204 2,253,215 3,800,222 3,032,206 4,932,193 3,428,876 5,698,233 4,549,253 
NOTE: In columns 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 we report the marginal effects of probit regression. In columns 2 and 6 the 
coefficients from ols regression. Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are in parenthesis. We 
drop the years when outcome variable does not vary in the regressions (i.e. years -1 and 0 in first column 
since everyone is employed). Post-displacement tenure regression is estimated for workers that were 
employed in year 1. 
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These results are reported in figure A2 in appendix. They are in line with the 
results when using the plant closure definition: female job loss decreases fertility 
and male job loss has no effect. Similarly to plant closure results, the effect of 
female mass layoff on fertility was biggest for highly educated workers.22  Male 
workers displaced in mass layoffs seem to have slightly less children than non-
displaced workers in the years before displacement. This difference can most 
likely be explained by employment contract legislations. In some manufacturing 
industries the employee contracts require that when employers need to lay off 
workers for productive reasons, they first have to lay off workers with the least 
tenure and no children.23  
As a final robustness check we extend the analysis to a recovery period to see 
whether the results obtained using data from the early 1990’s, during which 
Finland experienced a very deep recessions, hold for other periods. Figure A3 
report the results for base years 1996–1998. The results are very similar to 
recession period. Female job loss during the recovery years decreases fertility, 
while male job loss has no effect on fertility. Since the earning losses during 
recovery years were much smaller, the results again indicate that the fertility 
responses to female job loss are driven by other reasons than income losses.  
                                              
 
22 In earlier version of this study, Huttunen and Kellokumpu (2012), we report all the results using both 
displacement definitions. The results using mass layoff definitions are very similar to plant closure 
results. The earlier version uses one third random sample of females in the FLEED data instead of the 
total FLEED data. 
23 See the Finnish federation for industries and technology 
http://www.teknologiateollisuus.fi/fi/tyomarkkina-asiat/tyoehtosopimukset.html 
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5. Conclusions 
In this study we have examined how job loss that is due to plant closure affects 
couples’ fertility patterns by following the same couples for more than 15 years. 
Because job displacement is an exogenous shock to a worker’s career, we can 
estimate the causal effect of this shock on the fertility behavior of couples. 
Unlike previous studies, we focus on couples and compare how the effect of job 
displacement varies with spouses’ and couples’ characteristics. We also studied 
how job displacement affects couples’ other outcomes, such as permanent family 
income, joint employment decisions, and employment stability and divorce 
probability. This helps us to better understand the mechanism through which job 
displacement affects fertility behavior.  
Our results indicate that female job loss decreases completed fertility by 1.8%. 
The effect is stronger for highly educated women (2.6%). Despite the fact that we 
find that a man’s job loss results in a very long-lasting and even stronger effect 
on total family income than a woman’s own job loss, it has no effect on 
completed fertility. When splitting the sample further by pre-displacement 
education and tenure, we find no evidence that groups with larger income losses 
after female job loss have stronger fertility responses. This suggests that the 
possible mechanism through which female job displacement affects fertility is 
not only the income effect, but the difficulties women face in reestablishing their 
careers after job loss. The only groups for which we find significant responses 
after male job loss are the couples in which women are well attached to labor 
market and couples with the largest estimated income loss: the low educated high 
tenure males.  
Our study has contributed to previous research on income and fertility by 
examining how shocks to permanent family income affect couple’s fertility 
decision at the micro-level. Contrary to studies that use exogenous changes in 
aggregate male income, we do not find that couple’s react strongly to an income 
loss generated by male job loss. We also contribute to the literature on the effects 
of job displacement on fertility by explicitly comparing male and female job 
losses in similar contexts. Our study is also the first that documents how female 
and male job displacements affect permanent family income. The results are in 
line with the study on the effects of female job loss using Austrian data by Del 
Bono et al. (2012) who also find that a woman’s job displacement decreases 
fertility. However, the fact that we do not find any effect of male job loss on 
average fertility is in contrast with the study by Lindo (2010), which provides 
some evidence that male job displacement decreases fertility in the U.S. The 
difference between his and our findings suggests that the effect of job loss on 
fertility may depend on institutional factors such as the costs of higher education 
and the access to health care. Also, our study suggests that the mechanism 
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through which job displacement affects fertility may be much more complex than 
just an income channel.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1.  Descriptive characteristics of pre-displacement characteristics and 
post-displacement outcomes by worker’s education 
 Females Males 
Variable Low Educated Highly Educated Low Educated Highly Educated 
Pre-displacement 
characteristics at t 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Age  32.67 32.66 32.13 32.02 34.29 34.52 34.97 35.01 
Experience 13.24 13.24 8.95 8.58 12.92 13.31 9.06 8.99 
Tenure 6.33 6.67 5.87 5.41 7.29 8.80 5.89 6.39 
Plant size 50.45 119.56 75.71 121.31 50.43 144.36 89.09 159.08 
Annual earnings  16.91 17.12 21.84 21.80 23.04 23.53 34.25 34.20 
Family Income  37.59 38.11 47.82 47.60 36.73 37.28 50.39 50.61 
Spouse employed .80 .80 .86 .86 .74 .73 .76 .76 
Married .65 .65 .69 .68 .67 .69 .80 .79 
Number of children at t-4 1.01 .99 .77 .751 .98 1.00 1.01 1.00 
Number of children  1.16 1.15 1.02 1.00 1.30 1.33 1.42 1.42 
Observations 4670 168693 2341 81201 7229 251819 3899 121084 
Outcome variables at t+1 Displaced Non-
displaced 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Displaced Non-
displaced 
Employed .61 .91 .77 .94 .62 .93 .75 .95 
Earnings 13.82 16.28 20.09 21.03 19.33 23.13 30.62 33.75 
Family Income 35.54 37.59 47.03 47.33 35.08 37.74 48.91 51.26 
Gave birth .07 .08  .11 .13 .10 .10 .13 .12 
Number of children 1.24 1.24 1.14 1.14 1.41 1.44 1.56 1.56 
Observations 4667 168566 2340 81108 7232 252115 3887 120781 
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Table A2. Effect of job displacement on earnings by tenure and education 
Females  All  Low Ed High Ed L. Ed L. Ten L. Ed H. Ten H. Ed L. Ten H. Ed H. Ten
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
dpl_2 .253** .022 .563** .195 .173 .979** .0434 
 (.126) (.125) (.262) (.189) (.165) (.411) (.338) 
dpl_1 .057 -.088 .209 .035 -.046 .486 -.069 
 (.126) (.125) (.261) (.188) (.165) (.411) (.338) 
dpl1 -1.911*** -2.443*** -1.035*** -2.758*** -2.048*** -1.755*** -.587* 
 (.126) (.125) (.262) (.188) (.165) (.411) (.338) 
dpl2 -4.025*** -4.588*** -3.097*** -3.969*** -4.924*** -3.220*** -3.095*** 
 (.126) (.125) (.262) (.188) (.165) (.412) (.338) 
dpl3 -3.253*** -3.626*** -2.712*** -2.999*** -3.943*** -2.746*** -2.786*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.262) (.189) (.166) (.413) (.338) 
dpl4 -2.805*** -3.165*** -2.295*** -2.496*** -3.509*** -1.748*** -2.764*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.262) (.189) (.166) (.413) (.339) 
dpl5 -2.377*** -2.803*** -1.759*** -2.358*** -2.967*** -1.319*** -2.156*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.263) (.189) (.166) (.413) (.339) 
dpl6 -1.977*** -2.396*** -1.400*** -1.978*** -2.552*** -.862** -1.868*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.263) (.189) (.166) (.413) (.339) 
dpl7 -1.609*** -1.973*** -1.171*** -1.658*** -2.055*** -.791* -1.533*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.263) (.189) (.166) (.414) (.339) 
dpl8 -1.358*** -1.623*** -1.137*** -1.268*** -1.754*** -.879** -1.407*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.263) (.189) (.166) (.414) (.339) 
dpl9 -1.293*** -1.551*** -1.086*** -1.177*** -1.708*** -.760* -1.404*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.263) (.190) (.166) (.415) (.340) 
dpl10 -1.203*** -1.374*** -1.177*** -1.071*** -1.483*** -.664 -1.607*** 
 (.127) (.126) (.264) (.190) (.166) (.416) (.340) 
dpl11 -.953*** -1.088*** -1.079*** -0.748*** -1.252*** -.274 -1.752*** 
 (.133) (.132) (.271) (.195) (.178) (.422) (.353) 
Observations 3,811,443 2,571,474 1,239,969 1,056,732 1,514,742 554,232 685,737 
Males All  Low Ed High Ed L. Ed L. Ten L. Ed H. Ten H. Ed L. Ten H. Ed H. Ten
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
dpl_2 .555*** -.084 .916*** 0.207 .124 .867* 1.081***
 (.152) (.134) (.325) (.234) (.164) (.514) (.418) 
dpl_1 .365** -.236* .662** .133 -.258 .440 0.803* 
 (.152) (.134) (.325) (.233) (.164) (.514) (.418) 
dpl1 -3.189*** -3.671*** -3.141*** -3.491*** -3.603*** -4.013*** -2.595*** 
 (.152) (.134) (.325) (.233) (.165) (.515) (.418) 
dpl2 -6.451*** -6.834*** -6.668*** -5.529*** -7.321*** -6.974*** -6.451*** 
 (.153) (.135) (.325) (.234) (.165) (.515) (.418) 
dpl3 -5.237*** -5.445*** -5.839*** -4.100*** -5.911*** -5.819*** -5.8197*** 
 (.153) (.135) (.325) (.234) (.165) (.516) (.419) 
dpl4 -4.520*** -4.754*** -5.124*** -3.491*** -5.153*** -5.076*** -5.114*** 
 (.153) (.135) (.326) (.234) (.165) (.516) (.419) 
dpl5 -3.893*** -4.240*** -4.393*** -2.912*** -4.674*** -4.170*** -4.485*** 
 (.153) (.135) (.326) (.234) (.165) (.516) (.419) 
dpl6 -3.248*** -3.690*** -3.634*** -2.459*** -4.075*** -3.239*** -3.850*** 
 (.153) (.135) (.326) (.235) (.165) (.516) (.419) 
dpl7 -2.968*** -3.297*** -3.601*** -2.032*** -3.717*** -2.849*** -4.053*** 
 (.153) (.135) (.326) (.235) (.165) (.518) (.420) 
dpl8 -2.622*** -3.060*** -3.131*** -1.798*** -3.498*** -2.844*** -3.279*** 
 (.154) (.135) (.327) (.236) (.166) (.518) (.420) 
dpl9 -2.760*** -3.080*** -3.489*** -1.889*** -3.485*** -3.112*** -3.683*** 
 (.154) (.136) (.327) (.236) (.166) (.520) (.420) 
dpl10 -2.717*** -3.045*** -3.492*** -1.880*** -3.425*** -2.846*** -3.860*** 
 (.154) (.136) (.327) (.236) (.166) (.520) (.420) 
dpl11 -2.466*** -2.941*** -2.995*** -1.874*** -3.260*** -2.929*** -2.989*** 
 (.154) (.136) (.328) (.236) (.166) (.521) (.421) 
Observations 5,825,112 3,928,997 1,896,115 1,103,859 2,825,138 660,254 1,235,861 
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Table A3. Effect of job displacement on family income by tenure and 
education 
Females  All  Low Ed High Ed L. Ed L. Ten L.Ed H. Ten H. Ed L. Ten H. Ed H. Ten
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
dpl_2 .282 -.016 .536 .223 .092 .868 .110 
 (.236) (.231) (.493) (.345) (.309) (.760) (.647) 
dpl_1 -.099 -.322 .018 -.221 -.265 .322 -.232 
 (.236) (.230) (.492) (.344) (.309) (.759) (.647) 
dpl1 -1.330*** -1.926*** -.508 -2.380*** -1.426*** -1.322* .089 
 (.236) (.230) (.493) (.344) (.309) (.759) (.647) 
dpl2 -2.239*** -2.500*** -2.130*** -2.273*** -2.572*** -2.173*** -2.078*** 
 (.236) (.230) (.493) (.344) (.310) (.761) (.647) 
dpl3 -2.243*** -2.376*** -2.402*** -2.237*** -2.354*** -2.575*** -2.271*** 
 (.236) (.231) (.494) (.344) (.310) (.762) (.648) 
dpl4 -2.241*** -2.267*** -2.624*** -1.915*** -2.407*** -2.610*** -2.597*** 
 (.236) (.231) (.494) (.344) (.310) (.762) (.649) 
dpl5 -2.025*** -2.317*** -1.911*** -1.984*** -2.437*** -1.859** -1.910*** 
 (.237) (.231) (.495) (.345) (.310) (.763) (.649) 
dpl6 -1.713*** -1.971*** -1.712*** -1.548*** -2.175*** -1.406* -1.892*** 
 (.237) (.231) (.495) (.345) (.310) (.764) (.650) 
dpl7 -1.509*** -1.749*** -1.596*** -1.249*** -2.030*** -0.889 -2.055*** 
 (.237) (.231) (.495) (.346) (.310) (.764) (.650) 
dpl8 -1.549*** -1.621*** -2.000*** -1.187*** -1.859*** -1.918** -2.015*** 
 (.237) (.231) (.496) (.346) (.311) (.765) (.650) 
dpl9 -1.313*** -1.584*** -1.359*** -1.273*** -1.730*** -0.937 -1.605** 
 (.237) (.232) (.496) (.346) (.311) (.767) (.650) 
dpl10 -1.308*** -1.349*** -1.834*** -.718** -1.766*** -1.924** -1.721*** 
 (.238) (.232) (.497) (.347) (.311) (.768) (.651) 
dpl11 -1.020*** -0.883*** -2.018*** -.215 -1.371*** -1.924** -2.049*** 
 (.248) (.243) (.511) (.357) (.332) (.779) (.676) 
Observations 3,811,443 2,571,474 1,239,969 1,056,732 1,514,742 554,232 685,737 
Males All  Low Ed High Ed L. Ed L. Ten L.Ed H. Ten H. Ed L. Ten H. Ed H. Ten
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
dpl_2 .668*** .114 .704* .309 .314 .815 .698 
 (.187) (.168) (.393) (.293) (.206) (.624) (.505) 
dpl_1 .330* -.263 .438 .137 -.361* .323 .434 
 (.187) (.167) (.393) (.292) (.206) (.624) (.505) 
dpl1 -1.903*** -2.250*** -2.306*** -2.112*** -2.215*** -3.225*** -1.813*** 
 (.187) (.168) (.393) (.292) (.206) (.625) (.506) 
dpl2 -3.398*** -3.488*** -4.372*** -2.863*** -3.703*** -4.729*** -4.251*** 
 (.187) (.168) (.393) (.292) (.206) (.624) (.506) 
dpl3 -3.162*** -3.281*** -4.161*** -2.567*** -3.491*** -4.247*** -4.190*** 
 (.187) (.168) (.394) (.293) (.206) (.625) (.506) 
dpl4 -2.991*** -3.191*** -3.903*** -2.439*** -3.386*** -3.930*** -3.946*** 
 (.188) (.168) (.394) (.293) (.206) (.625) (.507) 
dpl5 -2.665*** -2.998*** -3.424*** -2.090*** -3.263*** -2.997*** -3.735*** 
 (.188) (.168) (.394) (.293) (.206) (.626) (.506) 
dpl6 -2.187*** -2.689*** -2.749*** -1.772*** -2.964*** -2.039*** -3.246*** 
 (.188) (.168) (.394) (.294) (.207) (.626) (.507) 
dpl7 -2.042*** -2.447*** -2.850*** -1.469*** -2.771*** -1.964*** -3.460*** 
 (.188) (.169) (.395) (.294) (.207) (.628) (.508) 
dpl8 -1.818*** -2.249*** -2.684*** -1.188*** -2.644*** -2.359*** -2.930*** 
 (.188) (.169) (.396) (.295) (.207) (.629) (.508) 
dpl9 -1.823*** -2.250*** -2.716*** -1.042*** -2.743*** -2.243*** -3.044*** 
 (.189) (.169) (.396) (.295) (.207) (.630) (.508) 
dpl10 -1.668*** -2.148*** -2.548*** -1.054*** -2.578*** -1.574** -3.203*** 
 (.189) (.169) (.396) (.296) (.207) (.630) (.508) 
dpl11 -1.433*** -1.938*** -2.276*** -0.890*** -2.444*** -1.527** -2.855*** 
 (.189) (.169) (.397) (.296) (.208) (.632) (.509) 
Observations 5,825,112 3,928,997 1,896,115 1,103,859 2,825,138 660,254 1,235,861 
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Figure A1. Effect of job displacement on fertility for married couples 
 
Figure A2. Effect of job displacement due to mass layoff on fertility 
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Figure A3. Effect of job displacement during recovery period on fertility 
(years 1996–1998) 
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Appendix B 
Figure B1.  Effect of job displacement on annual earnings by education (FE) 
 
Figure B2.  Effect of job displacement on cumulative number of children (FE 
specification) 
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Figure B3.  Effect of job displacement on fertility by education and tenure 
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Figure B4.  The effect of female job displacement by pre-displacement wage 
(A) and pre-displacement earnings share (B) 
 
Table B1.  Average worker characteristics in the years before plant closure 
All workers Plants that close down between  
t and t+1 
Plants that do not close down btw  
t and t+1 
 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=0 
Female .41 .42 .42 .45 .49 .49 .49 .49 
Age 34.28 34.75 35.34 35.78 34.67 35.13 35.76 36.41 
Primary .33 .32 .31 .30 .31 .30 .29 .28 
Secondary .43 .42   .42 .43 .42 .42 .42 .421 
Tertiary .23 .25 .25 .26 .25 .26 .27 .29 
Tenure 5.07 5.16 5.59 6.15 6.07 6.25 6.62 7.04 
Annual earnings  21.15 21.98 21.88 20.92 20.63  21.18 21.64 21.70 
Married .57 .571 .57 .58  .58 .58 .59 .60  
Number of children  .92 .92 .92 .95  .94 .94 .94 .94 
Plant size 92.13 78.51 62.98 41.18639 165.88 156.20 145.62 132.85 
Observations 52885 55393 53796 51817 2103439 2173720 2184807 2208812 
NOTE: Private sector firms. We dropped two digit industries with share of workers that experienced plant  
closure less than 0.05%.  
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Table B2.  Effect of job displacement on fertility 
Effect by years 
since 
displacement 
At least one spouse employed at t Both spouses employed at t 
Female Job Loss Male Job Loss Female Job Loss Male Job Loss 
Number of 
children 
Gave birth Number of 
children 
Gave birth Number of 
children 
Gave birth Number of 
children 
Gave birth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dpl_3 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
dpl_2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
dpl_1 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.003
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
dpl_0 0.000  -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
dpl1 -0.014** -0.013*** -0.002 0.001 -0.018** -0.016*** -0.006 0.001
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
dpl2 -0.014* 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.016* 0.003 -0.004 0.001
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
dpl3 -0.014* 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.015 0.002 -0.009 -0.005
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
dpl4 -0.023*** -0.007*** -0.005 -0.000 -0.025** -0.008** -0.009 0.001
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003)
dpl5 -0.024*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.019 0.004 -0.013 -0.005
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003)
dpl6 -0.026*** -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.020 -0.000 -0.014 0.001
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
dpl7 -0.029*** -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.021 0.001 -0.014 0.000
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003)
dpl8 -0.032*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.020 0.002 -0.015 -0.002
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002)
dpl9 -0.030*** 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.017 0.002 -0.015 -0.000
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002)
dpl10 -0.029*** 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.017 0.002 -0.017 -0.004*
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
dpl11 -0.031*** 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.015 -0.000 -0.020* -0.001
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.015) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002)
Observations 3,800,222 3,800,222 5,698,233 5,698,233 1,924,981 1,924,981 1,924,981 1,924,981 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are in parenthesis. The years when outcome 
variable does not vary (e.g. all are employed in years t – 1 and t) are dropped from the regression, which 
explains why the number of observations varies between columns. Sample consists of women who were 
20–40 years old at time t (base years 1991–1993), who were working in the end of the year t and t – 1 and 
who did not give birth during year t. 
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Children, Labor Supply and Income: Evidence from 
Exogenous Variation in Family Size in Finland  
Abstract  
The well-known study of Angrist and Evans (1998) uses parental preferences for 
a mixed-sibling sex composition and twins instruments to estimate the causal 
effect of children on parents' labor supply and income. This study uses the same 
identification strategy to investigate the impact of children on parental 
employment outcomes in a Nordic welfare state with high female employment 
rates and a strong preference for children's home care promoted by the state. 
Cohabiting and married women adjust their labor supply dramatically after the 
third child: the likelihood of employment decreases by almost 40 percentage 
points. Especially pronounced this effect is for women with secondary or higher 
education. For fathers and for single mothers there is no effect of children on 
employment.   
JEL: J13, J22   
Keywords: family gap, children, labor supply, earnings, income, instrumental 
variables   
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1. Introduction   
A number of studies have empirically examined the association between family 
size and labor market outcomes of parents. Others study the effect of family size 
on labor supply and wages, whereas others examine the effect of earnings and 
labor supply on fertility. As Angrist and Evans (1998) put it: “Since fertility 
variables cannot be both dependent and exogenous at the same time, it seems 
unlikely that either sort of regression has a causal interpretation.” Besides, there 
are theoretical reasons to believe that fertility and labor supply are jointly 
determined.1 The past empirical work has solved the endogeneity of fertility by 
using a natural experiment, a policy reform or a fixed effects estimator.   
This study uses two sorts of “natural experiments” to study the causal effect of 
children on female labor supply and wages. Following identification strategy in 
Angrist and Evans (1998) I use the instrumental variables (IV) strategy based on 
either, (i) families' preference for sibling sex mix or (ii) the birth of twins in order 
to identify the causal effect of family size on labor supply, wages and income of 
women in Finland. The same-sex instrument is based on the observation that 
parents of same-sex siblings are more likely to go on to have an additional child 
(see e.g. Westoff et al., 1963, Williamson, 1976, Angrist and Evans, 1998). 
Because a birth of twins is virtually randomly assigned, the event of twinning 
creates potentially exogenous variation in the family size.2 Twinning at first birth 
has been extensively used in studies estimating the causal relationship between 
family size and labor market outcomes (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980a, b; 
Bronars and Grogger, 1994; Gangadharan and Rosenbloom, 1996; Jacobsen et al. 
1999; Vere 2011). Instead of twinning at first birth, Angrist and Evans (1998) 
focus on second multiple births to be able to compare the estimates of the same-
sex instrument to the estimates of the twin instrument.3 Likewise, in this study 
twinning at second birth is used as an alternative instrument for change in family 
size from two to three children.4  
Angrist and Evans (1998) find that children reduce the labor supply of women by 
12 percentage points in 1980 and 9 percentage points in 1990 in the US. Iacovou 
(2001) uses the same exogenous variation in family size to study the effect of 
                                              
 
1 See, e.g. Schultz 1981, or Goldin, 1990. 
2 The randomness of twinning may be violated due to infertility treatments. 
3 Vere (2011) uses multiple births both at first birth and second birth to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity when analysing US census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000.  
4 The effect of change from two to more than two children is particularly interesting since it seems to 
reduce maternal employment significantly in Finland. Just over 80 percent of mothers with one or two 
children under age 18 are employed whereas only 67.5% of mothers with three children or more work. 
For fathers, the employment-to-population ratio is around 90% regardless of the family size. (Statistics 
Finland, 2008.)   
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children on maternal employment in the UK. Although there is a negative 
correlation between maternal employment, she finds no causal relationship 
between mothers' labor supply and fertility. She suggests, that the differences 
between the US and the UK labor markets – i.e. policies, which are aimed at 
helping mothers to return to work – explain why an additional child does not 
reduce maternal employment in the UK. Also Hirvonen (2010) adopts the same-
sex approach and finds that for Swedish mothers a third birth decreases the 
likelihood of labor force participation by around 10 percentage points in next 
three years following childbirth, but this effect decreases as the child grows up. 
Moreover, she cannot find any difference in maternal labor supply effects over a 
long time period – of women who gave birth to their third child in 1980 and of 
women who gave birth to their third child in 19955 – despite the rapid expansion 
of family policies over this time period in Sweden.6 Based on the results of 
Angrist and Evans, and Iacovou and Hirvonen, it is clear that both differences in 
the labor market institutions and in family policies lead to differences in parental 
employment – especially in maternal employment in different countries. Both the 
US and UK have employment rates of mothers of school-aged children around 
70%. This is 10 percentage points less than for mothers with school-aged 
children in Finland. The difference in maternal employment is even more 
pronounced for mother, whose youngest child is between the ages of three and 
five. In the US, the employment rate of mothers, whose youngest child is 
between the ages of three and five, is only 62% and even less in the UK, whereas 
in Finland the employment rate is 80%.   
The Nordic countries – Finland among them – have been pioneers in developing 
models for combining work and family. Policies adopted in the Nordic countries 
have inspired many other European countries to create their own family policies 
and many countries today are making decisions on their family policies. As in all 
Nordic countries, Finland has such family policies as job-protected parental 
leave, low cost-high quality public day care and the right to take time off for the 
care of a sick child. Despite sharing many of the key features of the family 
policies common to all Nordic countries, Finland has a very unique model of 
reconciling maternal employment and care of small children. A key feature that 
distinguishes Finland from other Nordic countries is the right to extend the job-
protected parental leave until the youngest child turns three based on the 
Employment Contracts Act. The extension of parental leave is supported by the 
state: a parent who takes child home care leave receives child home care 
                                              
 
5 Hirvonen (2010, 11) describes that “The individuals in the sample are given time to complete the 
transition to a third birth within a few years before or in the same year I observe their earnings.” 
6 Another studies using the same (or similar) identification strategies to study maternal employment in the 
western countries include Cruces and Galiani (2007) for Latin-America, Daouli, Demoussis, and 
Giannakopoulus (2009) for Greece, and Maurin and Moschion (2009) for France. Ebenstein (2007) 
provides evidence of an increase in family size on labor supply by exploiting a preference for sons in 
Taiwan. Chun and Oh (2002) use son-preference in Korea. 
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allowance.7 The allowance is also paid to a parent who stays at home to look 
after a child and does not have an employment contract. This unique policy is 
very popular among Finnish families: over half of Finnish children under the age 
of two are taken care of at home by their mothers. As a result, in Finland the 
employment of mothers of very young children decreases to US and UK levels. 
Only half of the mothers with children under the age of three participate in the 
labor force compared to an over 70% employment rate for the same group in 
Sweden and Denmark. This raises the question whether the combination of this 
particular set of policies in Finland actually benefits mothers' employment.   
This study adds to the existing literature in following way. I examine how having 
one more child affects maternal employment in an economy with high female 
labor force participation rates and a strong preference for home care of very 
young children. In particular, this paper sheds light on the issue, whether 
institutions that facilitate reconciling work with family (job-protected parental 
leave up to three years per child, low cost public day care, a right to take time of 
for the care of a sick child and child benefits) actually benefit mothers’ labor 
market outcomes. I also link fertility to the employment outcomes of fathers. 
This aspect of the study is particularly interesting since during the 21st century 
Finland has attempted to promote gender-equality also in the care of children by 
expanding the rights of fathers to take leave from work for the care of children.   
I find that both cohabiting and married women adjust their labor supply 
dramatically after the third child: the likelihood of employment decreases by 
around 35 percentage points. Especially pronounced this effect is for women 
with secondary education. For women with secondary education, a third child 
reduces the employment probability by over 40 percentage points. For fathers 
and single mothers an increase in family size has no effect on employment. These 
results are much larger than the ones received in the US, the UK and Sweden by 
using the same identification strategy. However, the relatively large maternal 
labor supply effects found in this study are in line with the earlier Finnish 
                                              
 
7 All parents in Finland are eligible for earnings-related parental allowance during maternity, paternity 
and parental leave. Annual earnings up to 29 393 euros are compensated by 70%. From annual earnings 
above 29 393 euros the compansation percent is 45 until 45 221 euros. For the part of annual earnings 
above 45 221 euros 25% is compensated. In case of no previous earnings or very low annual earnings the 
person is paid a flat minimum allowance. This flat minimum allowance is 15.20 euros/day and it is paid 
for 6 days a week. The length or parental leave is 263 days (10.5 months). After parental leave, parents 
have a right to extend their leave until the youngest child turns three. This leave is supported by the Child 
Home Care Allowance, which includes a care allowance and, depending on the family's income, a care 
supplement. The care allowance is paid separately for every child eligible for the allowance. The amount 
of the care allowance is 336.67 euros per month for one child under 3 years and 100.67 euros per month 
for each additional child under 3 years and 64.77 euros per month for a child over 3 years but under 
school age. The care supplement depends on the size and gross income of the family. The maximum 
amount of care supplement is 180.17 per month and it is paid for one child only. Many municipalities also 
pay an additional supplement on the top of child home care allowance if the child does not use public day 
care. For more information see, http://www.kela.fi/in/internet/english.nsf/NET/150502155459EH. 
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research, which has found large response margin for Finnish mothers. Kosonen 
(2011) examines the effect of Child Home Care subsidies on maternal labor 
supply and finds a large negative effect on the labor force participation: a 
monthly increase of 100 euros in the supplement reduces the maternal labor 
supply by 3%.   
The paper is organized as follows. The following chapter reviews the existing 
literature. The data and the sex-mix intruments' first stage are described in 
Chapter Three. Chapter Four presents the emprirical framework and discusses the 
results. Chapter Five concludes.   
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2. Previous Literature   
The inference between fertility and labor market outcomes of women using the 
same-sex instrument were first drawn by Angrist and Evans (1998). In their study 
they exploit parental preference for mixed-sibling sex composition and the birth 
of twins at second birth when estimating the causal effect of children on mothers’ 
labor supply. Their instrumental variables estimates confirm the negative effect 
that children have on the labor supply of mothers implied by the OLS estimates, 
although the OLS regressions seem to exaggerate the causal effect of children. 
They find that children reduce the labor supply of women by 12 percentage 
points. The finding of Angrist and Evans (later referred as AE) is obtained with 
the US Census data from 1980 and 1990. Jacobsen, Pearce and Rosenbloom 
(1999) use 1970 and 1980 US Censuses and the birth of twins at first birth as 
instrument for family size. They find significant but small effect of children on 
both labor supply and earnings in the short run, and no effect in the long run. 
Recently, Vere (2011) uses multiple births at first and second birth when 
analysing US Census data from 1980, 1990 and 2000. He finds that for single 
women the causal effect of children on labor supply has declined over time 
suggesting that incentives for work have improved particularly for this group. In 
contrast, he finds that the increase in married men's labor earnings in response to 
multiple births have risen over time. Based on this result Vere (2011) argues that 
the traditional gender roles within a household have gained new popularity.8 
The parental preference for 'balanced' families – a preference to have both boys 
and girls – is also exploited by Iacovou (2001) for the UK. She finds that fertility 
is associated with a 15% reduction in maternal employment but this effect 
disappears once the family size is instrumented. She explains this finding by the 
differences in the labor market conditions in the US and the UK: subsidized day 
care, more generous maternity leave provisions, right to take time off to look 
after a sick child, and good availability of part-time jobs mean that more mothers 
in the UK choose to work. Hence, the negative relationship between fertility and 
maternal employment in the UK results from heterogenous preferences of 
mothers rather than children actually preventing mothers to work.   
Hirvonen (2010) uses the same identification strategy for Swedish parents. She 
finds that for Swedish mothers a third birth decreases the likelihood of labor 
force participation by around 10 percentage points in the next three years 
following childbirth, but this effect decreases as the child grows up. Moreover, 
she finds no statistically significant change in the impact of the third birth to 
                                              
 
8 Vere acknowledges the increase in planned multiple births due to fertility treatments and the potential 
bias in his results based on year 2000 Census files. However, since fertility treatments are more likely for 
older women and his sample is limited to women aged 21 to 35 he considers the potential bias to be fairly 
small.   
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labor supply over a 15-year time period (of women who gave birth to their third 
child in 1980 and of women who gave birth to their third child in 1995), in which 
the Swedish family policies expanded rapidly.    
Both the sex-preference and twins-based instruments are used to investigate the 
influence of children on marital stability. Vuri (2001) uses the sex-mix 
preference and finds that children have a positive effect on divorce probability. 
Cáceres-Delpiano (2006) instruments family size with multiple births and finds 
an increase in the probability of divorce.9 
There is also a large literature on family policies and their labor market 
consequences. The reduction in child-care prices in Sweden had no effect on 
employment (Lundin et al. 2008), while in Canada (Baker et al. 2008, Lefebre 
and Merrigan 2008) there was a positive effect on employment. The availability 
of school slots for two-year-olds had a positive impact on employment of single 
mothers in France (Goux and Maurin 2010). Ruhm's (1998) cross-country 
comparison finds a positive association between the maternity leave and female 
employment. A study on the effect of an extension of parental leave in Austria 
finds a negative impact on employment (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009). The 
results also suggest that both cash transfers and job protection are important for 
employment decisions. Also Baker and Milligan (2008) find that long expansions 
in job-protected leave result in reductions in maternal employment in Canada. 
Similarly, the policy of job protected child home care leave has a large negative 
impact on maternal employment in Finland (Kosonen 2011).   
                                              
 
9 Bedard and Deschenes (2005) use the sex of the firstborn child to instrument divorce and study the 
causal effect of divorce on economic status of women.   
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insurance12 in the last week of the year and has earned income during that year 
based on the registers of income taxation of individuals.13 The data also report 
annual Labor income and annual Taxable earned income. The annual labor 
income refers to earned income received by income recipients during the year 
excluding entrepreneurial income.14 The measure of annual taxable earned 
income is income that is subject to state taxation. It includes (i) wage income, (ii) 
entrepreneurial income and (iii) other income subject to state taxation – such as 
other earned income (e.g. dividends, which are taxed as earned income), (iv) 
pension income, (v) social security transfers subject to state taxation – such as 
unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, maternity and paternity allowance, child 
home care allowance, study grant and adult education subsidy and other social 
security benefits.15 Because I have excluded women, who are entrepreneurs (for 
spouses no such restriction is made) the main difference for women between 
Labor income and Taxable earned income is that the latter includes social 
security transfers.16 The final variable is Family income, which includes the 
annual taxable earned income of both spouses.    
The classification of main economic activity is problematic in regard to my 
research question. Mothers who are on a job-protected maternity leave have a 
valid, statutory earnings-related pension insurance. Hence, they are classified as 
employed. For this reason, I redefine my variable of main interest Worked for 
pay in another way. A person is defined to have worked for pay if she satisfies 
the following condition: (i) the sum of child related allowances 
(maternity/paternity leave benefit and home care allowance) is less than 50% of 
the annual taxable earned income and share of benefits in total (child related 
allowances, unemployment benefits and sickness benefits) is less than 50%. In 
sensitivity analysis, I also use two alternative measures of Worked for pay 
variable: (i) the sum of child related allowances is less than 40% and share of 
benefits in total less than 40% (ii) the sum of child related allowances is less than 
30% and share of benefits in total less than 30%. To see how the composition of 
women classified as Worked for pay changes as I change the criteria is presented 
in Table 1. I also show the number of women employed based on Statistics 
                                              
 
12 Employers have to take occupational pension insurance for all 18-68 year-old employees, when their 
monthly earnings exceed a certain amount. Earnings-related pensions are paid for working incapacity, 
long-term unemployment and old age, see http://www.stm.fi/en/insurance/statutory_insurance. 
13 For more information, see http://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/tyovoima_ulkopu_en.html and 
http://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/amm_toimi_en.html 
14 For a more thorough description, see http://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/tyotulot_en.html. 
15 Social security benefits, which are not subject to state taxation are child benefit, general housing 
allowance and other forms of housing assistance, and labor market subsidy. 
16 This restriction does not make much of a difference in the sample size since self-employment is very 
rare among women in Finland. 
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sample. As expected, the share of fathers who are employed is high: 94 percent 
of cohabiting and 95 percent of married fathers work. Of cohabiting and married 
mothers around 66 percent are employed. The mean annual labor income of both 
cohabiting and married fathers is reasonably higher than the mean earnings of 
their spouses. Cohabiting fathers' annual labor income is almost 28 000 euros and 
annual taxable income is near 31 000 euros while their spouses have annual labor 
income of less than 13 000 euros and taxable income around 16 000 euros. 
Married fathers' annual labor income is 29 000 euros and taxable income is over 
32 000 euros while their wifes have roughly 13 000 euros of labor income and 
less than 17 000 euros of taxable income.     
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics, Women Aged 21–35 with 2 or More 
Children in 2004 
 Couples Married 
Variable: All women Single women Women Men Women Men 
Children ever born 2.39 2.36 2.40 2.44  
More than 2 children (0/1) 0.297 0.276 0.300 0.320  
Boy 1st (0/1) 0.514 0.521 0.513 0.517  
Boy 2nd (0/1) 0.513 0.516 0.512 0.514  
Two boys (0/1) 0.261 0.261 0.262 0.264  
Two girls (0/1) 0.234 0.224 0.236 0.232  
Same sex (0/1) 0.495 0.485 0.497 0.496  
Twins-2 (0/1) 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012  
Age of the youngest child 3.75 4.81 3.55 3.50  
Age 31.41 30.95 31.50 34.42 31.70 34.57 
Age at first birth 23.65 22.05 23.94 27.18 24.20 27.28 
Worked for pay 0.647 0.599 0.655 0.940 0.668 0.951 
Labor income 12 302 10 224 12 681 27 648 13 149 29 004 
Taxable income (inc. transfers) 16 072 13 998 16 450 30 945 16 889 32 184 
Family income (inc. transfers) 42 242 13 998 47 395 47 395 49 073 49 073 
Obs. 26 534 4 094 22 440 22 440 17 187 17 187 
Notes: The couples sample refers to women who were cohabiting in 2004 and to their spouses. Age of the 
spouse at first birth refers to spouses at the time of the first birth and hence may not necessarily be the age 
of the current spouse. Besides, not all of the cohabiting women in 2004 had a spouse at the time of their 
first birth. Also, spouse identifier is available only from year 1990 onwards. Hence for first births occurring 
in 1988 or 1989 I cannot observe the age of the father. For these reasons, the age of the first time fathers is 
based on 20 145 observations in the Couples sample and 15 727 observations in Married sample. 
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where ݕ௜ is a measure of labor supply and ݔ௜ is the endogenous fertility measure. 
Let ݖ௜ denote the binary instrument, Same sex. The IV estimate of ߚ in this 
equation is  
ߚூ௏ = (ݕതଵ − ݕത଴)/(̅ݔଵ − ̅ݔ଴)    
where ݕതଵ is the mean of ݕ௜ for those observations with ݖ௜ = 1 and other terms are 
similarly defined. The numerator and denominator capture the reduced-form 
relationships between ݕ௜  and ݖ௜  and between ݔ௜  and ݖ௜.  
The IV method attributes any effect of ݖ௜  n ݕ௜ to the effect of ݖ௜ on ݔ௜. The 
estimate, ߚூ௏, can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE) 
specific to the instrument, ݖ௜. This means that ߚூ௏ estimates the average effect of 
ݔ௜ on ݕ௜ only for individuals whose fertility has been affected by the sex of their 
first two children. In other words, the effect is estimated only for those, who had 
a third child because their first two children were of the same sex. Similarly, 
when the instrument of twinning at second birth, Twins-2, is used, the effect is 
estimated for those who have had more children than they otherwise would have 
because of twinning. Since the complier groups are different, these two different 
instruments do not necessarily identify the same average effect. Do these 
instruments have an effect on the More than 2 children variable, in other words, 
is there a first stage? The first stage, the effect of Same sex on More than 2 
children is presented in Table 5. The effect of the Same sex instrument on More 
than 2 children (equal to the difference in means reported in Table 3 is 0.042. 
The effect of Same sex on Number of children is 0.060. Angrist and Evans 
estimated the same effects to be 0.060 (0.063) and 0.077 (0.084) in 1980 (in 
1990). The effect of the Twins-2 on More than 2 children is 0.711, and on 
Number of children is 0.808 in my data. For US women, the same results of 
Twins-2 instruments were 0.603 and 0.809 in 1980.   
To begin with calculating the Wald estimate, one needs the difference in the 
means of the outcome of interest, for instance Worked for pay, between those 
who had their first two children of the same sex and those who did not. In other 
words, the difference in Worked for pay variable when the instrument Same sex 
is switched on and off, ݕതଵ − ݕത଴. This is referred as reduced form. This difference 
is then divided by the difference in the More than 2 children (or in Number of 
children) between the same groups. Hence, Wald estimate is the reduced form 
divided by the first stage. Put it more formally, the Wald estimate is calculated 
by dividing ݕതଵ − ݕത଴ by ̅ݔଵ − ݔ଴.    
The first three columns of Table 5 report the components of ߚூ௏ when Same sex 
is used as the instrument. In the last three columns the instrument is Twins-2. 
The first two rows of the table show the denominator of the Wald estimate, 
̅ݔଵ − ݔ଴, for two possible choices of ݔ௜. One is an indicator for having had a third 
child, More than 2 children. The other is the total Number of children.  
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Table 5.  Wald Estimates of Labor-Supply Models 
  Wald estimate using as 
covariate:  
Wald estimate using as 
covariate: 
Variable: 
Mean 
difference 
by Same sex 
More than 2 
children 
Number of 
children 
Mean 
difference 
by Twins-2 
More than 2 
children 
Number of 
children 
More than 2 
children 
0.0417 
(0.0056) 
  0.7114 
(0.0262) 
  
       
Number of 
children 
0.0598 
(0.0089) 
  0.8076 
(0.0418) 
  
       
Worked for 
pay 
-0.0134 
(0.0059) 
-0.321** 
(0.141) 
-0.224** 
(0.098) 
0.0168 
(0.0278) 
0.024 
(0.039) 
0.021 
(0.035) 
       
Out of labor 
force 
0.0126 
(0.0054) 
0.302** 
(0.131) 
0.210** 
(0.091) 
-0.0147 
(0.0255) 
-0.021 
(0.036) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
       
Labor 
income 
-204.08 
(140.36) 
-4 899.4 
(3 327.1) 
-3 409.9 
(2 307.0) 
-207.93 
(663.77) 
-292.3 
(931.3) 
-257.5 
(819.6) 
       
ln(Family 
income) 
0.0051 
(0.0085) 
0.122 
(0.206) 
0.085 
(0.143) 
-0.0600 
(0.0401) 
-0.084 
(0.056) 
-0.074 
(0.050) 
Notes: Samples are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors are in parantheses. There are 92 zero family 
incomes, hence the last row is estimated with 26 442 observations. Significance level: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 % 
 
Table 5 also reports ݕതଵ − ݕത଴ for alternative outcomes – employment, labor force 
participation, labor income and family income – using Same sex instrument. 
These results show that in addition to having more children than women with one 
boy and one girl, women with two children of the same sex are less likely to be 
employed and more likely to be outside of labor force.    
The Wald estimate calculated by dividing ݕതଵ − ݕത଴ by ̅ݔଵ − ݔ଴ when ݔ௜ is More 
than 2 children imply that having more than two children reduced maternal 
employment by 32.1 (-0.0134/0.0417) percentage points, increased withdrawal 
from the labor force by 30.2 (0.0126/0.0417) percentage points, and decreased 
labor income by 4 899 (-204.08/0.0417) euros per year. However, the estimate on 
Labor income is statistically insignificant. In AE the Wald estimate for Worked 
for pay is -0.133 in 1980 and -0.084 in 1990. Hence, the labor supply effect of 
Finnish mothers in 2004 is much larger than the ones of US mothers in 1980 and 
1990. What might explain this large difference in maternal employment between 
these two countries? The most likely explanation would be the policy of Home 
Care Allowance in Finland and other institutional reasons in the labor market, 
which will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 5.   
The Wald estimates calculated using the effect of Same sex on Number of 
children put these effects in per child terms. In per child terms (column 3), the 
Wald estimates are 0.70 as large as the estimates produced with More than 2 
children.    
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where x is the first-stage effect of the instrument. The alternative specification 
uses the two components of Same sex – Two boys and Two girls – as instruments 
for More than 2 children. Either ݏଵ௜ or ݏଶ௜ must be dropped from the list of 
exogenous variables because ݏଵ௜, ݏଶ௜ and (1-ݏଵ௜)(1-ݏଵ௜) are linearly dependent. I 
choose to drop ݏଶ௜. The model becomes the following:   
ݕ௜ = ߨ଴ᇱݓ௜ +∝ଵ ݏଵ௜ + ߚଵݔ௜ + ߝ௜ 
The first stage relationship between	ݔ௜ and sex mix is:   
ݔ௜ = ߨ଴ᇱݓଵ + ߨଵݏଵ௜ + ߨଶݏଶ௜ + ߛ଴(ܶݓ݋	ܾ݋ݕݏ) + ߛଵ(ܶݓ݋	݃݅ݎ݈ݏ) + ߟ௜ 
where Two boys = ݏଵ௜ݏଶ௜ and Two girls=(1-ݏଵ௜)(1-ݏଵ௜ ).   
The first-stage results are reported in Table 6. The instrument Same Sex has a 
statistically significant impact on the More than two children variable. The first 
two children of the same sex increase the probability of having more than two 
children by 4.3 percentage points. The point estimate is larger for girls (0.0459) 
than for boys (0.0391) – although the estimates do not differ in statistical sense. 
Moreover, there is no statistically significant relationship between having a boy 
as firstborn and childbearing at higher parities (More than two children variable).    
In Table 7 I present both the OLS and 2SLS estimates. The association between 
the More than 2 children variable and mothers' labor supply is negative as 
expected. Having more than two children is associated with a 26 percentage 
points decrease in the employment probability of all mothers. For cohabiting 
mothers, the point estimate is slightly larger, -0.280, and of the same magnitude 
for married women. For single women, the association between employment and 
increase in family size is not as large, the point estimate being -0.218.   
Turning into 2SLS estimates, the instrumental variable estimate is of the same 
size as the OLS estimate in the All women sample. Instead, both for cohabiting 
and married mothers the 2SLS estimates are even larger than the OLS estimates. 
Another child reduces maternal employment by 36 to 40 percentage points. This 
is in contrast to the results of AE, who find that the OLS estimates exaggerate the 
causal effect of children on employment. It is not clear why the bias in OLS 
estimates in Finland is of opposite sign than in the US. For some reason, Finnish 
cohabiting and married mothers whose fertility is affected by the sex of their first 
two children have a stronger labor supply response than would be implied by the 
simple OLS regressions. One explanation could be the differences in labor 
market institutions between these two countries: a job-protected maternity leave 
up to three years per child perhaps the most important one. Another reason could 
be that the compliers – women whose fertility is affected by the sexes of their 
first two children – are different in a way which affects their labor supply 
decisions. It is also worth remembering, that the US results are from 1980 and 
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1990 whereas I have analysed data from 2004. The society in both countries must 
have developed in since 1980s and 1990s. It would be interesting to see if the 
labor supply effects of US women would be different today. The 2SLS estimate 
in the single women sample is statistically insignificant.   
There is a positive association between More than 2 children and Out of labor 
force status in the whole sample and in all subsamples. Again, in the Single 
women sample the 2SLS estimate is statistically insignificant. In the Couples 
sample, mothers of three children are 32 percentage points more likely to be 
outside the labor force compared to mothers of two children only. For married 
mothers the estimated impact is even higher: they have a 46 percentage points 
higher probability to be outside the labor force compared to mothers of two 
children.   
The negative association between family size and female earnings is quite 
sizeable, 6 000 euros. This is 50% of the mean annual labor earnings reported in 
Table 2. Once the More than 2 children is instrumented by the Same Sex in All 
women sample, there is no statistically significant impact on earnings. 
Interestingly, for Cohabiting and Married women, the negative effect remains in 
the 2SLS estimations. The 2SLS estimate is around 6 000 euros and statistically 
significant for women in both the Couples sample and Married sample. When 
taking into consideration the negative impact on labor supply the magnitude of 
this effect is not surprising. Typical for a Nordic welfare state, the negative 
earnings loss due to children is compensated (at least partly) by the state which 
explains why the 2SLS estimate of Taxable income is insignificant. The annual 
taxable income was a measure of income that is subject to state taxation. It 
includes (i) wage income, (ii) entrepreneurial income and (iii) other income 
subject to state taxation – such as other earned income (e.g. dividends, which are 
taxed as earned income), (iv) pension income, (v) social security transfers subject 
to state taxation – such as unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, maternity and 
paternity allowance, child home care allowance, study grant and adult education 
subsidy and other social security benefits. In addition, for Family income (joint 
annual taxable income of both spouses) there is no impact.   
Surprisingly, for spouses of cohabiting and married women the OLS estimates 
between the More than 2 children and Worked for pay variables are also 
negative, although the magnitude is not large. However, according to the 2SLS 
results in Table 8, fathers do not adjust their labor supply once family size 
increases, at least not in the extensive margin (whether to work or not). It would 
be interesting to see if there is a labor supply response of fathers on the intensive 
margin (how many hours they work) and if so, whether the adjustment is positive 
or negative. Unfortunately, the data do not report hours worked. An indirect way 
to look at this is to estimate the effect of family size on the earnings of fathers. 
However, there is no evidence of a positive (or negative) effect of family size on 
men's earnings or income.      
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5. Conclusions   
The well-known study of Angrist and Evans (1998) using parental preference for 
sibling sex mix finds that children have a negative causal impact of 12 
percentage points on maternal employment in the US in 1980. The evidence of 
their study should, however, be interpreted in the context of labor market 
institutions and family policies of the US three decades ago. In fact, Iacovou 
(2001) has found that in the UK the third child does not affect maternal 
employment once this increase in family size is instrumented with the sexes of 
the first two children. She explains this contradiction between the US and the UK 
by the differences in the labor market conditions. Results based on the families 
preference to have both boys and girls from Sweden are similar to the ones found 
in the US: a third birth decreases the likelihood of mothers' labor force 
participation by around 10 percentage points (Hirvonen, 2010). Interestingly, the 
impact of an additional child on maternal labor supply does not change between 
1980 and 1995 – despite the rapid expansion of family policies in Sweden over 
this time period. In this paper, I provide evidence from another Nordic welfare 
state with a strong preference of home care of small children promoted by the 
Home Care Policy: the right to take leave from work up to three years to look 
after a child and receive financial compensation.   
Using the Employment Statistics Database for 2004 combined with birth 
registers, and applying the IV-estimation techniques of Angrist and Evans 
(1998), I identify the effect of fertility on maternal employment in Finland – a 
high-fertility/high female employment economy. I find that having more than 
two children is associated with a 26 percentage points decrease in the 
employment probability of mothers. This effect remains when I instrument the 
family size with the sexes of the first two children.   
Moreover, an increase in family size has a heterogenous labor supply response by 
marital status and spouse's earnings and by mother's education. Cohabiting and 
married women adjust their labor supply dramatically after the third child: the 
likelihood of employment decreases by almost 40 percentage points. Especially 
pronounced this effect is for women with secondary education. For these women, 
a third child reduces the employment probability by over 40 percentage points. 
Also highly-educated mothers have a sizeable decrease in employment after 
another child: the likelihood of employment decreases by almost 35 percentage 
points. For single mothers there is no effect of an increase in family size on 
employment. Mothers whose spouse has earnings in the top third of the earnings 
distribution are 42 percentage points more likely to be outside labor force after 
another child. These results could be interpreted in the spirit of the traditional 
theory of household time allocation (Becker, 1960, 1981). Single mothers and 
mothers with primary education are often credit constrained and have no choice 
other than market work. In families, where the spouse's earnings belong to the 
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middle or top third of the earnings distribution, mothers are able to take time off 
from work to look after their children. Reasons related to a child's development 
in early childhood might also play a role in maternal labor supply decisions – 
especially for more educated mothers.   
The labor supply responses of Finnish mothers are remarkably larger than the 
ones found in the US, in the UK and in Sweden. There are several possible 
reasons for larger effects in Finland. One explanation could be the differences in 
labor market institutions between these countries and Finland: mainly a job-
protected maternity leave up to three years per child. Another reason could be 
that the compliers – women whose fertility is affected by the sexes of their first 
two children – are different in a way which affects their labor supply decisions. It 
is also worth noting that the US results are from 1980 and 1990, the UK results 
from 1991 and the Swedish results from 1980 and 1995, whereas I have analysed 
data from 2004.    
These results are particularly interesting in the context of Nordic type gender-
equal family policies and equal labor market opportunities for mothers and 
fathers. The results indicate that Finland has not succeeded in promoting equal 
parenting: there is no effect of an increase in family size on fathers' labor supply. 
On the contrary, the policy of Child Home Care – a family policy that is unique 
to Finland and where a parent is given a relatively generous allowance for taking 
care of her children at home and a right to return to one's employment if she has a 
permanent employment contract – has pushed mothers outside labor force. 
Cohabiting and married mothers are still less likely to be employed or more 
likely to be outside labor force once the youngest child turns three. For those 
women the use of Child Home Care Allowance might have been an alternative 
for unemployment (Hämäläinen, 2005). In addition, Finnish labor markets can be 
described as in or out -markets: whether you work total hours or you do not work 
at all. In other words, part-time jobs, which could be preferred by mothers of 
small children, are seldom available. The results are in line with Kosonen's 
(2011) evidence from the effect of Finnish Child Home Care subsidies on 
maternal labor supply. He finds a large negative effect on the labor force 
participation: monthly increase of 100 euros in the supplement reduces the 
maternal labor supply by 3%.     
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Baby and Pay: The Family Gap in Finland   
Abstract  
The effect of career interruptions due to parental leave is estimated based on a 
longitudinal data set covering the years 1995–2002. The estimated model 
controls for hours worked. There appears to be a significant negative relation 
between career interruptions due to childbirth and subsequent wages for women 
in Finland. The effect for men is quite the opposite. The estimation results imply 
that human capital depreciation could be one explanation when explaining the 
family gap in wages.  
JEL: J65, J13, J12   
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1. Introduction   
The gender wage gap has been in the centre of wage inequality research in 
Finland, whereas the family gap, the differences in wages between mothers and 
childless women, has not. However, one reason to gender wage gap may be the 
long career interruptions of women because of having children (Datta Gupta and 
Smith, 2000). Women suffer from the loss of accumulation of work experience 
and job tenure during maternity and parental leave periods, which may affect 
their wage and career profiles.    
Although family policies, such as job-protected maternity leave and childcare, in 
general are considered to decrease the gender wage gap by allowing mothers to 
maintain continuity of employment and good job matches, especially maternity 
leave may in fact have the opposite effect on the gender gap (Waldfogel, 1998). 
In other words, the maternity leave clearly does help to diminish the gender gap 
by enabling women to return to employment, but there are many reasons why 
these benefits may also weaken the labor market position of women.    
First, family leaves are used mainly by women causing women to accumulate 
less work experience compared to men. Second, job-protected maternity leave 
may induce women to spend more time out of work due to childbirth than 
otherwise (Waldfogel, 1998). Third, maternity/parental leave imposes costs 
(direct and indirect) on employers, and in theory these costs would be passed 
along to the affected employees in the form of lower wages or lower employment 
(Summers, 1989).    
Several empirical studies, for instance in the US and in the UK, have found that 
the number of children has a negative effect on women’s wages, but no or even a 
positive effect on the wages of men (Korenman and Neumark, 1991, 1992; 
Waldfogel, 1997, 1998; see for Finnish results Kellokumpu, 2006). The negative 
effect of children on mothers’ wages may reflect reduced work effort or previous 
periods out of labor market due to childbirth and child-rearing. Career 
interruptions due to childbirth and child-rearing (or some other reason for that 
matter) are found to reduce the human capital and earnings capacity of mothers 
(e.g. Ruhm, 1998). However, the results are not unambiguous. Empirical 
evidence from Sweden (Albrecht et al., 1999) and Denmark (Naur and Smith, 
1997; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2000) finds that there is no wage penalty for 
mothers who enter into maternity leave. Different results in different countries 
probably reflect differences in institutional characteristics of the labor markets: 
Scandinavian countries have a long tradition of working mothers and thus 
universal maternity leave schemes and children’s day care.    
In this paper, I analyse the effect of career interruptions due to parental leave 
both on mothers’ and on fathers’ subsequent wages. Having children causes 
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different labor market outcomes, especially for women. Most women withdraw 
themselves completely from labor markets in order to care for the child. 
However, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of career interruptions 
due to childbirth for those women who remain in the labor force and return to 
work after the formal maternity leave. The data set is a unique panel data set 
covering almost the entire private sector in Finland during the years 1995–2002. 
Thus, it is possible to control for unobserved time constant heterogeneity among 
individuals in the data. Besides, the data allows me to use the accurate hourly 
wage along the monthly wage. By using the hourly wage I am able to control for 
the hours worked. When hourly wage is not used the possible differences in 
monthly (or yearly) earnings can be due to different number of hours worked. If 
it is more likely for women than men to cut down their working time when there 
are little children in the family, it is very important to control for hours worked.     
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2. Theoretical Background   
According to the human capital theory, there has been several explanations why 
becoming a mother weakens the earnings capacity of women. (Mincer and 
Polachek, 1974.) First, prospective discontinuity may influence young women to 
choose less on-the-job training than men, especially if the cost of training is 
relatively high. The employer can also choose to train women less because of the 
expected career interruption. Second, the time off from work for childbearing and 
child-rearing does not accumulate work-related human capital. Furthermore, the 
time out of the labor market can even expose a person to human capital 
depreciation (skill atrophy). In case of multiple children born in a short period of 
time, a woman could spend several years at home or return to employment only 
briefly leading to even more human capital depreciation.  
Becker (1985) claimed that childcare and housework responsibilities are one of 
the main reasons for earnings and occupational differences between men and 
women. He argued that married women spend less energy on market work than 
married men working the same number of hours. Mothers could be less 
productive at work than childless women or men if they are exhausted by home 
duties or thinking and taking care of family obligations during the working hours. 
Furthermore, they seek less demanding jobs for better reconciliation between 
work and family life duties. This self-selection into jobs that are easier to 
combine with family but less paid is, according to Becker, a major reason behind 
mothers’ lower wages. However, the voluntary nature of this selection is not that 
clear: family-related obligations are seen to be an obstacle for women to get 
promotions (Goldin, 1990).    
The possibility to work part-time is seen as the most obvious non-pecuniary, 
“family-friendly” job characteristic (Budig and England, 2001). Working part-
time enables mothers (and fathers too, for that matter) better to combine family-
life obligations and work. Part-time work among mothers is very typical 
especially in countries that have no or only poor public childcare available, such 
as in Germany and in the UK1 Part-time jobs in general are often less paid also 
on an hourly basis. However, the family gap in pay persists even when controls 
for part-time and full-time work are included (Waldfogel, 1997).    
An interesting interpretation about the impact of parental leave on wages was 
presented by Albrecht et al. (1999) when they found that taking parental leave 
has a serious negative effect on wages of men in Sweden but not those of 
women. They suggested that taking parental leave has a signalling effect: men’s 
                                              
 
1 Although working part-time is more typical for women than men in Finland, the most common reasons 
for working part-time are working while studying and part-time pension, not childcare (Suomalainen 
lapsi, 2007). 
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parental leave tells about their lower commitment to their careers. Because 
(almost) all mothers take parental leave it is a less important signal about their 
degree of commitment to the employer.    
The discrimination theory, on the other hand, suggests that mothers are treated 
differently just because they are mothers. In economic theory, discrimination is 
based either on taste or statistics. In the taste-based model the employer has no 
assumptions about mothers’ lesser productivity but she simply finds working 
mothers unpleasant workers, which would be the reason for treating them 
differently (e.g. paying them less or promoting them less, etc.). Statistical 
discrimination suggests that mothers are paid according to their average 
productivity. This means that mothers who are more productive than the average 
mother are paid less than would be commensurate with their productivity. In the 
taste-based discrimination model, the average pay is less than the average 
productivity among mothers. Sex-based discrimination, on the other hand, is 
based on the probabilistic assumption that all women are potential future 
mothers. Sex-based discrimination creates a gender gap in pay while taste-based 
and statistical discrimination leads to a gap between mothers and other women 
(although taste-based and statistical discrimination affects the gender wage gap, 
too). (Budig and England, 2001.)    
The family gap in wages can also simply be due to unobserved heterogeneity 
between those who have children and those who remain childless. Therefore, it is 
important to control for this possible heterogeneity in characteristics that are 
correlated with wages and that we cannot observe from the data (such as career 
orientation, motivation, work effort, etc.). However, according to Waldfogel 
(1997) mothers and childless women do not systematically differ from each other 
in ways that would affect wages.    
Last, the economic theory of fertility suggests that children (and therefore career 
interruptions due to childbirth) could actually be an endogenous variable in the 
wage equations (Korenman and Neumark, 1994). The price of children is often 
measured by the earnings level of the mother. The higher the earnings of the 
mother, the higher is the forgone value of her time spent at childcare, i.e. the cost 
of children. Therefore an increase in the earnings of the mother increases the 
relative price of children and thus decreases the demand for children (substitution 
effect). However, the effect is not that straightforward; an increase in the 
earnings of the mother increases the joint income of the household, thus the 
family can afford to have more children (income effect). Depending on which 
one of these two opposite effects is the dominant one, the increase in wages 
could lead to an increase in family size.   
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3. Finnish Parental Leave and Childcare System   
It is typical to all Nordic countries to have universal and rather generous benefits 
to mothers and families in purpose to enable women with children to participate 
in the labor market. Despite many common features, the Finnish family leave and 
childcare system is different from those of other Nordic countries. Finland has a 
relatively short parental leave compared to other Nordic countries and a long 
childcare leave, which does not exist in other countries.    
The Finnish parental leave consists of maternity leave and parental leave. In total, 
the duration of Finnish parental leave is 263 workdays (10.5 months). The first 
105 days are addressed only to the mother (maternity leave). The last 158 days 
(parental leave) can be used either by the mother or by the father, or the parents 
can divide those days. Typically it is the mother who uses the last 158 days. 
During these leaves parents receive maternity and parental allowances paid by 
the Social Insurance Institution of Finland.2 Annual earnings up to 29 393 euros 
are compensated by 70%. From annual earnings above 29 393 euros the 
compensation percent is 45 until 45 221 euros. For the part of annual earnings 
above 45 221 euros 25% is compensated. In case of no previous earnings or very 
low annual earnings, the person is paid a flat minimum allowance. This flat 
minimum allowance is 15.20 euros/day and paid for 6 days per week. Maternity 
and parental allowances are paid regardless whether the parent works at the same 
time or not. However, if she works during the time she is entitled for parental 
allowance, she receives a flat minimum allowance instead of earnings-related 
allowance. If the employer continues to pay salary during the leave (or during 
part of the leave) allowance from these days is paid to the employer to 
compensate the payroll.3 
In addition to the parental leave, fathers have the right to take paternity leave up 
to three weeks to spend time at home together with the mother and the newborn 
when the mother is on maternity leave. The paternity leave is very popular 
amongst Finnish men: two out of three fathers take paternity leave. Paternity 
leave is an exception: receiving paternity allowance requires an absence of work. 
The compensation scheme is the same as in the case of maternity and parental 
allowance. Paternity leave can be a paid leave paid by the employer as well. 
However, it is not known how often the employer continues to pay salary during 
the paternity leave.    
                                              
 
2 The Social Insurance Institution of Finland pays from parenthood not only to wage earners, but also to 
students, unemployed persons and housemothers and fathers. 
3 In 2005 only half of the mothers whose maternity allowance was based on earnings received salary 
during the leave. In most cases the duration of paid maternity leave is 50–72 days. 
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All the children under six years are entitled to public day care. However, the 
public childcare is not the only choice for how to arrange the caring of children. 
The most distinctive feature of the Finnish system from other Nordic countries is 
the child home care allowance, which is received by the family if the child, who 
is not yet three years of age, does not use public childcare. The allowance is paid 
until the youngest child in the family reaches the age of three or transfers to 
municipal day care, or until the family chooses to receive private day care 
allowance instead. In other words, if the other parent stays at home to take care 
of the children (or uses a private provider), the government supports it 
financially. However, the financial compensation is relatively small compared to 
earnings-related maternity, paternity and parental allowances. Child home care 
allowance is a flat fee. Perhaps a more important feature of the home care 
allowance is that parents who have a permanent employment contract and who 
take leave from work to care for a child at home by the support of the home care 
allowance maintain their employment. This job-protected home care leave makes 
Finland a very unique country – even among the Nordic countries. Moreover, the 
entitlement for the job-protected leave is renewed every time when a child is 
born to the family.    
Taking care of your own children at home is more typical in Finland than in the 
other Nordic countries, mostly due to this unique childcare system. From under 
six-years-olds only 50% used public day care in 2002, while the same figure for 
Sweden and Denmark was 69% and 77%, respectively (under one-year-olds are 
excluded) (Haataja, 2006). Mainly it is the mother who stays at home; only few 
percent of home care allowance receivers are men. Although parents may take 
care of under three-year-old children and still maintain their work, staying at 
home may not be that voluntary: for 40% of these mothers it is an alternative to 
unemployment (Hämäläinen, 2005).   
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4. Data   
The data sets employed in this study were obtained from a variety of sources. 
The master data used in this study is a Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee 
Data (FLEED) provided by Statistics Finland. The data links employees to their 
employer at business and company level. Thus, the FLEED has crucial 
information about the characteristics of both the employee and her employer 
considering the wage setting. There are several variables concerning employees, 
such as their age, sex, marital status, presence of children and the age of the 
children, education, occupational status, months worked in a year, annual 
earnings, time spend out of the labor force due to unemployment, military 
service, study or for some other reasons (parental leave, etc.). Variables 
describing employers are, among other things, the industry in which the firm 
practises, the age of the firm, the size of the firm, the share of female workers in 
the place of business/firm, the net sales per employee and the total wage bill. 
This kind of data allows researchers to explain wages not only by the 
characteristics of the employee, but by the characteristics of the firm in which the 
employee is working. It is obvious that wages differ not only because individuals 
are different but because firms are too.    
Concerning this study, essential information needed is not just the presence and 
the age of children in the family, but the actual incident of family leave. 
Therefore, information about parental leave from Social Insurance Institution of 
Finland has been combined to FLEED data base. This information tells if the 
observed person has received maternity, paternity or parental allowance during 
the year and for how many days. It should be recognised that this kind of data is 
very seldom available for researchers. In addition, registered data about person’s 
hourly earnings provided by the Confederation of Finnish Industries has been 
linked to this formed data set.4    
The data set is a representative sample of the Finnish private sector. The data set 
includes employees aged 16–46 who have been working in the private sector at 
least once during the years 1995–2002. The formed data set is very unique in 
many ways. First of all, it is a data set that combines the characteristics of 
employees to the characteristics of their employers. Second, it has the 
information about the actual usage of maternity, paternity or parental leave and 
the duration of those leaves. Last, but not least important, the data includes the 
actual hourly wage paid to the employee. The possible differences in monthly (or 
yearly) earnings can be due to different number of hours worked. If it is more 
                                              
 
4 The fact that the hourly earnings are available only for those individuals whose employers belong to the 
Confederation of Finnish Industries makes my sample not completely representative sample of Finnish 
Private Sector. 
143 
 
 
likely for women than men to cut down their working time when there are little 
children in the family – or for fathers to work overtime – it is very important to 
control for hours worked. In fact, according to Statistics Finland, fathers do work 
longer hours than their childless counterparts (Suomalainen lapsi, 2007). It is 
interesting to see, whether this different working pattern between fathers and 
mothers explains the wage effects of having children.    
The sample selected to my study consists of women and men aged 20–39 who 
were still childless in the year 1995. I consider this age-restriction to be 
appropriate for two reasons. First, individuals under 20 years of age have relative 
low labor force participation rates and weak labor force attachment so they have 
not gained that much working experience. If these individuals were included to 
estimation it could bias the results. Second, although age 39 could seem to be 
quite high for women to give their first birth, the first birth givers in Finland are 
on average 28 of age (and the male is usually few years older than his partner).    
The sample is balanced so that each individual is observed during all eight years 
of observation. At the end of the observation period individuals are 27–46 years 
old. All the selected individuals are childless for the first two years of the 
observation period. I divide the sample into two groups: to those who remain 
childless and to those who have children. In this way I am able to analyze what 
kind of effect (if any) the parental leave has on an individual’s subsequent 
earnings when there is no previous history of taking parental leave. The total 
sample size is 14 343 individuals of whom 4 713 are women and 9 630 are men. 
The sample is restricted so that all the individuals are employed in the beginning 
of the observation period, meaning years 1995 and 1996, and have the hourly 
earnings observation, and the same should hold for years 2001 and 2002.5 In 
addition, the observed individuals cannot receive either Parental Allowance or 
Home Care Allowance in 2001 and 2002. This restriction is made in purpose of 
to exclude those individuals who take care of their children at home by the 
protection of childcare leave part of the year. From 4 713 women 545 have at 
least one child during the years 1997–2000 and 4 168 remain childless. For men 
the same numbers are 1 550 and 8 080, respectively. Table 1 reports the means 
and standard deviations of variables age, education (measured in the year 1996) 
and the total sum of parental leave (reported in months) between the years  
1997–2000 separately for each gender and for those who have children and for 
those who remain childless. Future mothers are some what younger than other 
women. The same holds for future fathers and other men. Surprisingly, future 
mothers seem to be more educated than other women, as are future fathers, too, 
compared to other men. The length of the parental leave is for women 
                                              
 
5 The employment status is measured in the last week of the year. This means that the person may have 
been out of employment (e.g. on childcare leave) at some point during the year. 
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significantly longer than for men: women on average spend 12 months on leave 
while men are on leave less than one month.   
Table 1.  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Age, Education and 
Length of Parental Leave by Gender and Future Family-Status in 
1996 
 Females Males 
 Mothers-to-Be Other Women Fathers-to-Be Other Men 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age  29.58 4.278 31.74 5.288 29.93 4.297 31.52 5.236
Education:         
Primary 0.101 0.302 0.141 0.348 0.105 0.307 0.142 5.236
Secondary 0.361 0.481 0.406 0.491 0.535 0.499 0.581 0.349
Lowest Level Tertiary 0.471 0.493 0.341 0.474 0.176 0.381 0.141 0.494
Lower-Degree Tertiary 0.050 0.217 0.050 0.218 0.103 0.304 0.076 0.349
Higher-Degree Tertiary 0.070 0.255 0.061 0.240 0.079 0.269 0.057 0.265
Doctorate or Equivalent 0.002 0.043 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.036 0.003 0.232
Length of Parental Leave in Months 12.272 4.015   0.832 0.624  0.054
Obs. 545  4 168  1 550  8 080  
Note: The length of parental leave is the total sum of parental leave between years 1997–2000 (reported in 
months). 
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5. Empirical Model   
The sample is restricted so that the individuals are all childless in the beginning 
of the observation period. This is a matter that most likely biases the results. 
Another selectivity problem is that for many women having children causes them 
to leave the labor market permanently or at least for a significant period of time. 
However, this study is about women who are fairly strongly attached to labor 
markets and return to work relative quickly after the parental leave. For this 
reason I have excluded women who leave labor markets permanently (or at least 
for several years after becoming a mother) from the wage equations. This sample 
selection could cause some bias in the results. However, according Napari and 
his results (2007) this sample selection is not a great problem. In addition, it 
should be recognised that women who remain childless (used as a comparison 
group) can be a selected group. Suppose there exists unobserved heterogeneity 
between childless women and mothers that is correlated with wages, which 
causes bias in the estimates. However, according Korenman and Neumark (1994) 
and Waldfogel (1997) there is only a slight or no effect at all in the results due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. Also Napari (2007) using Finnish data finds no 
serious bias in the results due to unobserved heterogeneity between mothers and 
non-mothers.    
The wage equations are estimated two years before and two years after the four-
year period (years 1997–2000) when the childbirth, and thus, the parental leave 
can take place. The estimates are conditional for the matter that the individuals 
selected to my sample were all childless in the beginning of the sample period. 
To correct for this I use the Heckman selection model as my estimation method 
(Heckman, 1976). The wage regression is specified as follows: 
݈݊ ௜ܹ௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ + ߝ௜௧   
Where ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of explanatory variables: age, age squared, education (six 
categories), field of education (nine categories), industry (seven categories), 
tenure and tenure squared. The subscripts i and t indexes the individual and time, 
respectively. ߚ଴ is the intercept, ߝ௜௧ the error term. The dependent variable, ௜ܹ௧, 
is the natural logarithm of calculated monthly or hourly earnings.6 The model is 
estimated conditional on the fact that the individuals do not have children at year 
t. The selection equation is: 
                                              
 
6 Monthly earnings are calculated from the FLEED data so that the annual wage is divided by months 
worked in that year. Wages are converted into 2002 money using the Cost-of-Living index of Statistics 
Finland. Hourly earnings are formed for white-collar and service workers by dividing the monthly 
earnings (reported by Confederation of Finnish Industries) with 4.333 (5/12) and regular weekly working 
hours. For manufacturing workers the total wage of the wage period is divided by the total working hours 
in that period. Wages are converted into 2002 money using the Cost-of-Living index of Statistics Finland. 
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ݖ௜௧∗ = ߛ଴ + ߛଵ݉ܽݎݎ݅݁݀ + ߛଷܽ݃݁௜௧ଶ + ߤ௜௧ > 0  
if an individual is childless in year t. Where ݖ௜௧∗  is an underlying unobserved 
variable, which is related to the decision of having children. Because we cannot 
observe ݖ௜௧∗ , the information about whether the individual was married in year t is 
used as an identifying variable of being childless in that year (t=1995). I am 
aware of the fact that being married could not only affect the decision of having 
children, but also wages. However, according the results of Napari (2007) 
marriage does not have any effect on wages of women in Finland. However, 
there is a possibility that for men marriage could affect also wages, see 
Korenman and Neumark (1991). Another concern of using information on 
marriage to identify the selection equation is that it probably is not a very good 
predictor for having children. Nevertheless, due to lack of a more appropriate 
identifying variable the information on marriage is used.   
The error terms of wage equation and selection equation are assumed to be 
distributed as follows: 
ߝ௜௧~ܰ(0, ߪ)	 
ߤ௜௧ = ܰ(0,1) 
where 
ܿ݋ݎݎ(ߝ௜௧, ߤ௜௧) = ߩ 
when ߩ ≠ 0. Standard regression techniques applied to the first equation yield 
biased results. The Heckman selection model provides consistent, asymptotically 
efficient estimates.   
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6. Estimation Results   
The estimates of the parental leave wage-effects are given in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
Table 2 presents Heckman’s selection-model results when the dependent variable 
is the log of calculated monthly earnings.7 The first three columns present 
estimated earnings functions for women; the final three columns present 
equivalent results for men. The first column for each gender presents the basic 
earnings function in the year 1996 (before the parental leave).8 This estimation 
includes Parent to Be dummy in order to see whether the initial wages differ 
between those who have children and those who remain childless. In fact, those 
having a baby in the future have better initial wages, though for women this 
effect is very modest. This result implies that mothers and childless women do 
not seem to differ from each other in ways that cannot be observed and which 
would affect wages. The future fathers, on the contrary, earn significantly better 
wages compared to other men. It probably reflects the result received in previous 
studies: married men receive a “marriage premium” in pay. The future fathers are 
more likely to be married in the year 1996 than those who remain childless 
during the observation period.    
The second column for each gender presents the basic earnings function 
estimates after the parental leave in the year 2001. The coefficient of the Parental 
Leave dummy is significantly negative for mothers. For men the estimated 
coefficient is positive and the same as Parent to Be dummy. It is evident that 
mothers suffer significant negative wage penalties as a result of taking parental 
leave (almost 7% lower compared to the earnings before the parental leave). The 
wage for men is unchanged when becoming a father and taking parental leave. 
An explanation for the negative wage-effect of taking parental leave for women 
and no effect for men is probably the different amounts of parental leave by 
gender (see Table 1). Women take long periods of parental leave, most more than 
10 months, while men take only 3 weeks or less. The third column for each 
gender presents the same estimates for the year 2002. The negative wage effect 
of taking parental leave is one percentage point lower for women than in 
previous year implying that the wage penalty is only temporary.   
 
  
                                              
 
7 The monthly earnings are calculated from the data so that yearly earnings are divided by the months 
worked per year. 
8 The basic earnings function before the parental leave is also estimated in year 1995, but not presented 
here because the results in year 1995 and 1996 are very similar. The estimation results from year 1995 are 
available by request from the author. 
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Table 2.  The Effect of Parental Leave on Log Monthly Earnings 
 Females Males 
Year 1996 2001 2002 1996 2001 2002 
Parent to Be 0.022* 
(0.010) 
  0.045*** 
(0.007) 
  
Parental Leave  -0.044***
(0.014) 
-0.031** 
(0.011) 
 0.045*** 
(0.009) 
0.046*** 
(0.007) 
Controls:       
Age 0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.046*** 
(0.013) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
       
Age2/100 -0.056*** 
(0.013) 
-0.059*** 
(0.018) 
-0.047***
(0.013) 
-0.043***
(0.011) 
-0.063*** 
(0.013) 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
       
Level of Education (Omitted group: Secondary) 
Primary -0.011 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.020) 
       
Lowest Level Tertiary 0.080*** 
(0.011) 
0.149*** 
(0.013) 
0.142*** 
(0.011) 
0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.154*** 
(0.012) 
0.152*** 
(0.010) 
       
Lower-Degree Tertiary 0.235*** 
(0.018) 
0.303*** 
(0.023) 
0.310*** 
(0.018) 
0.175*** 
(0.010) 
0.318*** 
(0.014) 
0.312*** 
(0.010) 
       
Higher-Degree Tertiary 0.399*** 
(0.020) 
0.586*** 
(0.029) 
0.580*** 
(0.018) 
0.304*** 
(0.011) 
0.495*** 
(0.017) 
0.497*** 
(0.013) 
       
Doctorate or Equivalent 0.413*** 
(0.074) 
0.545*** 
(0.078) 
0.647*** 
(0.122) 
0.363*** 
(0.040) 
0.564*** 
(0.052) 
0.567*** 
(0.041) 
       
Field of Education (Omitted group : Services) 
General Education 0.078*** 
(0.014) 
0.134*** 
(0.020) 
0.146*** 
(0.015) 
0.041* 
(0.019) 
0.166*** 
(0.027) 
0.183*** 
(0.026) 
       
Teacher Education and  
Educational Science 
0.017 
(0.089) 
-0.163 
(0.105) 
-0.293***
(0.056) 
0.252*** 
(0.019) 
-0.171 
(0.100) 
-0.257 
(0.158) 
       
Humanities and Arts -0.055 
(0.031) 
-0.099** 
(0.035) 
-0.086** 
(0.033) 
-0.050 
(0.042) 
-0.085 
(0.051) 
-0.078 
(0.059) 
       
Social Sciences and Business -0.013 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.027 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
Natural Sciences 0.212*** 
(0.036) 
0.252*** 
(0.032) 
0.271*** 
(0.035) 
0.100*** 
(0.026) 
0.174*** 
(0.052) 
0.147*** 
(0.032) 
       
Technology 0.043*** 
(0.013) 
0.072*** 
(0.016) 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
0.053*** 
(0.014) 
0.052** 
(0.018) 
0.055** 
(0.019) 
       
Agriculture and Forestry -0.097** 
(0.032) 
-0.110*** 
(0.032) 
-0.070* 
(0.033) 
-0.040* 
(0.020) 
-0.086** 
(0.030) 
-0.033 
(0.025) 
       
Health and Welfare -0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.033 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.033 
(0.033) 
-0.006 
(0.052) 
-0.030 
(0.034) 
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Industry (Omitted group : Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants) 
Agriculture, hunting and  
forestry, fishing, mining  
and quarrying 
-0.083 
(0.050) 
-0.086** 
(0.035) 
-0.092***
(0.026) 
0.123*** 
(0.031) 
0.085* 
(0.036) 
0.071* 
(0.032) 
       
Manufacturing 0.104*** 
(0.009) 
0.089***
(0.012) 
0.113*** 
(0.010) 
0.130*** 
(0.009) 
0.131***
(0.013) 
0.117*** 
(0.011) 
       
Electricity, gas and  
water supply, construction 
0.088*** 
(0.024) 
0.092** 
(0.030) 
0.125*** 
(0.027) 
0.163*** 
(0.013) 
0.171***
(0.017) 
0.155*** 
(0.014) 
       
Transport, storage  
and communication 
0.116*** 
(0.012) 
0.111***
(0.016) 
0.131*** 
(0.014) 
0.118*** 
(0.015) 
0.166***
(0.024) 
0.148*** 
(0.018) 
       
Finance 0.171*** 
(0.011) 
0.172***
(0.018) 
0.184*** 
(0.013) 
0.260*** 
(0.021) 
0.302***
(0.033) 
0.276*** 
(0.025) 
       
Public administration and  
defence; social security,  
education,  
health and social work 
0.086*** 
(0.012) 
0.114***
(0.017) 
0.116*** 
(0.013) 
0.107*** 
(0.014) 
0.068** 
(0.022) 
0.092*** 
(0.016) 
       
Tenure 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
       
Tenure2 /100 -0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.048***
(0.007) 
0.026***
(0.007) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
       
Constant 6.400*** 
(0.126) 
6.635***
(0.236) 
6.728*** 
(0.173) 
6.729*** 
(0.102) 
6.793***
(0.164) 
7.063*** 
(0.143) 
Note: Dependent variables are log of calculated monthly earnings . White's robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *Significant at 5%, **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0,1% 
 
When I take into account that there could have been career interruptions during 
the years 1997–2000 for other reasons than only having children, namely 
unemployment, studying, military service or for some other reasons the results do 
not change.9 Adding controls for different types of career interruptions besides 
parental leave does not make any difference: there is no change in the coefficient 
of the Parental leave variable (see Appendix). In addition, when some plant and 
firm characteristics (share of female workers, sales/worker and total factor 
productivity) are included, it does not change the results dramatically (see 
Appendix). Table 3 presents the same estimates as Table 1, only the dependent 
variable is log hourly earnings. Now the estimated “bonus” for future parents 
becomes significantly smaller (though for men it is still relatively high). 
Moreover, the wage penalty of mothers for taking parental leave decreases 
remarkably to only 3 percent. For fathers, the wage-effect of taking parental 
leave is now positive, though quite modest (one percentage point higher hourly 
earnings than before the parental leave). The smaller magnitude in the negative 
                                              
 
9 Although one could argue that it is unnecessary to control this because becoming a parent, especially a 
mother, could affect these. 
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wage-effects for mothers and positive for fathers, when log hourly earnings are 
used instead of log monthly earnings as dependent variable, are consistent with 
the explanation that women cut down their working hours when there are small 
children in the family while men tend to increase their work load. However, the 
negative effect of taking parental leave on wages of women and positive for men 
remains even when log hourly earnings are used as a dependent variable. For 
women, the most obvious explanation would be human capital depreciation: 
women suffer from skill atrophy during the parental leave and therefore are less 
productive at work after the career break. For men, the positive effect of having 
children on wages, even after controlling for the hours worked, is much more 
challenging to explain. It could reflect the unobserved heterogeneity: men who 
are successful at work, are also successful in other parts of their lives, for 
instance in the marriage market.    
The result that mothers suffer a wage penalty for taking parental leave while men 
do not and the fact that the duration of the parental leave is much longer for 
women than for men is in line with the human capital depreciation explanation of 
negative wage effects for having children. Long career interruptions due to 
childbearing and child-rearing cause women to suffer from skill atrophy, while 
men take only such little amounts of parental leave that no human capital 
depreciation can occur. The result that the negative wage effect of having 
children for women decreases in time also supports the human capital 
explanation: after returning to employment the human capital starts to recover 
and accumulate further.  
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Table 3.  The Effect of Parental Leave on Log Hourly Earnings 
 Females Males 
Year 1996 2001 2002 1996 2001 2002 
Parent to Be 0.015 
(0.009) 
  0.030*** 
(0.006) 
  
Parental Leave  -0.019* 
(0.009) 
 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
 0.040*** 
(0.006) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
Controls:       
Age 0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
       
Age2/100 -0.022* 
(0.011) 
-0.039***
(0.012) 
-0.043***
(0.012) 
 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.034***
(0.009) 
 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
       
Level of Education (Omitted group: Secondary) 
Primary -0.011 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.032* 
(0.014) 
-0.029 
(0.016) 
-0.030 
(0.016) 
       
Lowest Level Tertiary 0.078*** 
(0.009) 
0.120*** 
(0.009) 
0.130*** 
(0.009) 
0.072*** 
(0.007) 
0.140*** 
(0.008) 
0.151*** 
(0.009) 
       
Lower-Degree Tertiary 0.228*** 
(0.015) 
0.289*** 
(0.016) 
0.314*** 
(0.018) 
0.188*** 
(0.008) 
0.325*** 
(0.009) 
0.349*** 
(0.010) 
       
Higher-Degree Tertiary 0.423*** 
(0.016) 
0.556*** 
(0.016) 
0.580*** 
(0.017) 
0.346*** 
(0.009) 
0.513*** 
(0.010) 
0.555*** 
(0.011) 
       
Doctorate or Equivalent 0.493*** 
(0.040) 
0.523*** 
(0.069) 
0.566*** 
(0.068) 
0.408 
(0.032) 
0.511*** 
(0.030) 
0.592*** 
(0.033) 
       
Field of Education (Omitted group : Services) 
General Education 0.082*** 
(0.011) 
0.138*** 
(0.014) 
0.133*** 
(0.015) 
0.060*** 
(0.016) 
0.144*** 
(0.022) 
0.163*** 
(0.023) 
       
Teacher Education and  
Educational Science 
-0.037  
(0.079) 
-0.171*  
(0.079) 
-0.160  
(0.101) 
-0.107***
(0.017) 
-0.206***
(0.023) 
-0.343* 
(0.156) 
       
Humanities and Arts -0.059* 
(0.030) 
-0.074* 
(0.031) 
-0.090** 
(0.033) 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
-0.078* 
(0.038) 
-0.083* 
(0.041) 
       
Social Sciences and Business -0.010 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
       
Natural Sciences 0.179*** 
(0.028) 
0.275*** 
(0.028) 
0.273*** 
(0.032) 
0.094*** 
(0.023) 
0.151*** 
(0.027) 
0.155*** 
(0.028) 
       
Technology 0.020 
(0.011) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.038** 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
       
Agriculture and Forestry -0.075** 
(0.028) 
-0.079* 
(0.031) 
-0.093***
(0.029) 
-0.032 
(0.018) 
-0.063** 
(0.021) 
-0.072*** 
(0.021) 
       
Health and Welfare -0.001  
(0.013) 
-0.036** 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.029) 
-0.048 
(0.032) 
-0.033 
(0.031) 
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Industry (Omitted group : Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants) 
Agriculture, hunting and  
forestry, fishing, mining  
and quarrying 
-0.104* 
(0.051) 
-0.085***
(0.024) 
-0.136***
(0.027) 
0.085** 
(0.029) 
0.016 
(0.032) 
0.012 
(0.031) 
       
Manufacturing 0.060*** 
(0.007) 
0.078*** 
(0.008) 
0.083*** 
(0.008) 
0.107*** 
(0.008) 
0.081***
(0.010) 
0.077*** 
(0.010) 
       
Electricity, gas and  
water supply, construction 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.071** 
(0.025) 
0.076** 
(0.026) 
0.092*** 
(0.011) 
0.101***
(0.013) 
0.088*** 
(0.014) 
       
Transport, storage  
and communication 
0.084*** 
(0.010) 
0.120*** 
(0.012) 
0.116*** 
(0.012) 
0.075*** 
(0.013) 
0.133***
(0.016) 
0.120*** 
(0.017) 
       
Finance 0.151*** 
(0.010) 
0.163*** 
(0.012) 
0.159*** 
(0.012) 
0.251*** 
(0.021) 
0.268***
(0.025) 
0.261*** 
(0.026) 
       
Public administration and  
defence; social security,  
education,  
health and social work 
0.072*** 
(0.010) 
0.104*** 
(0.012) 
0.092*** 
(0.013) 
0.084*** 
(0.012) 
0.056***
(0.014) 
0.056*** 
(0.015) 
       
Tenure 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
       
Tenure2 /100 -0.033*** 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.041***
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.011* 
(0.005) 
       
Constant 1.769*** 
(0.101) 
1.651*** 
(0.146) 
1.608*** 
(0.159) 
2.044*** 
(0.084) 
1.963***
(0.120) 
1.995*** 
(0.126) 
Note: Dependent variables are log of calculated hourly earnings . White's robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *Significant at 5%, **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0,1% 
 
When I distinguish between whether the year 2001 is the first, second, third or 
fourth year back in employment, it is even more evident that the negative wage 
effect of having children is decreasing in time.10 Table 4 presents the estimates of 
taking parental leave by taking into account when the person had returned to 
work before the year 2001. The dependent variable is log of hourly earnings in 
2001 and 2002 (as in all Models presented in Table 4).11    
Table 4 also presents the effect of multiple career interruptions due to having 
children. Last, it is examined how the duration of the parental leave affects 
wages. For mothers one extra month of parental leave causes a 0.4% loss in 
wage. Interestingly, the coefficient of the length of parental leave is also negative 
for fathers indicating that leaves long enough held by fathers are affecting their 
level of human capital (skill atrophy) leading to lower wages. Alternative 
                                              
 
10 For those who had multiple parental leaves during the years 1997–2000, the year of the latest parental 
leave is used when calculating the return year. 
11 The results from otherwise the same earnings functions but where the dependent variable is log 
monthly earnings are very similar. They are available upon request from the author. 
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interpretation would be, in accordance with Albrecht et al. (1999), that taking a 
significant, long parental leave signals from lower commitment to work and 
career (and higher commitment to family life), which is shown in the wage of the 
father.  
It could be assumed that negative wage effects of parental leave are higher for 
highly educated women than for women with less education. One might expect 
that skill atrophy during the time out of work is more severe for highly skilled 
workers. Ellwood et al. (2004) found that indeed highly skilled women suffer 
greater wage losses of having children than other women. Although the results 
are not unambiguous, for instance Budig and England (2001) found no evidence 
that more skilled women would suffer higher penalties for having children. In 
this study there were no significantly different effects by education level either.    
Table 4.  Alternative Ways of Estimating the Effect of Parental Leave on 
Log Hourly Earnings 
 Females Males 
 2001 2002 2001 2002 
Year 2001 is the first year after the parental leave -0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
Year 2001 is the second year after the parental leave -0.031 
(0.016) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
0.052*** 
(0.011) 
0.054***
(0.012) 
Year 2001 is the third year after the parental leave 0.001 
(0.016) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
0.039** 
(0.013) 
Year 2001 is the fourthyear after the parental leave -0.037 
(0.030) 
-0.058 
(0.031) 
0.031 
(0.016) 
0.033* 
(0.017) 
One parental leave period between 1997–2000 -0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.041*** 
(0.007) 
0.043***
(0.008) 
Two parental leave periods between 1997–2000 -0.057***
(0.015) 
-0.046**
(0.017) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.027* 
(0.011) 
Three (or more) parental leave periods between 1997–2000 0.064 
(0.075) 
0.111 
(0.083) 
0.024 
(0.040) 
0.002 
(0.044) 
Parental leave 0.029 
(0.028) 
0.042 
(0.030) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.061***
(0.011) 
Total amount of parental leave (in months) during 1997–2000 -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.028** 
(0.010) 
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7. Conclusions   
In this paper, I have analysed the effect of taking parental leave on the wages of 
mothers compared to other women, and on the wages of fathers compared to 
other men. There appears to be a significant negative relation between career 
interruptions due to childbirth and subsequent wages for women in Finland. The 
relative loss in earnings of mothers is almost 7%. The effect for men is quite the 
opposite: their wages are either unaffected or even increased. However, this 
result is mainly due to the fact that men take only short leaves (less than 18 
days). For those men, who take significantly longer periods of parental leave, the 
effect is actually negative.    
The estimates from wage equations are higher when log monthly earnings are 
used instead of log hourly earnings. This indicates that a remarkable part of the 
cost of having children comes in the way that women when becoming mothers 
cut down their working hours (or do not take extra hours). Men, on the other 
hand, tend to work longer hours when there are children in the family, which 
explains the positive effect of a short parental leave on wages. However, the 
negative effect of taking parental leave on wages of women and positive for men 
remains even when log hourly earnings are used as a dependent variable. For 
women, the most obvious explanation would be human capital depreciation: 
women suffer from skill atrophy during the parental leave and therefore are less 
productive at work after the career break. For men, the positive effect of having 
children on wages, even after controlling for the hours worked, could reflect 
unobserved heterogeneity: men who are successful in the labor market are also 
successful in the marriage market.    
However, the results show that when the parental leave of the father lasts a 
substantially long time, the effect of the leave turns from positive into negative. 
This effect is easy to understand: if long breaks cause women to suffer from 
human capital depreciation, the same should happen to men too. Along Albrecht 
et al. (1999) there is also a possibility that men’s long parental leave is a negative 
signal for employers: “Too much” family-oriented men are penalized in pay.    
The result that mothers suffer a wage penalty for taking parental leave while men 
do not and the fact that the duration of parental leave is much longer for women 
than for men are in line with the human capital depreciation explanation of 
negative wage effects related to having children. Long career interruptions due to 
childbearing and child-rearing cause women to suffer from skill atrophy, while 
men take only such little amounts of parental leave, so that no human capital 
depreciation can occur. The result that the negative wage effect of having 
children for women decreases in time also supports the human capital 
explanation: after returning back to employment the human capital starts to 
recover and accumulate further.    
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Moreover, the negative effect of taking parental leave on wages of mothers is 
stronger when there is more than one career interruption. This result is very much 
in line with the human capital depreciation interpretation. Multiple career 
interruptions lead the human capital to accumulate less when the level of human 
capital is measured by the amount of work experience. Furthermore, several 
career breaks in short period of time dispose human capital to depreciate (skill 
atrophy).    
The main findings of this study give support for the human capital depreciation 
hypotheses. Women have, on average, a one-year career interruption per child 
leading to severe human capital depreciation. Men, on the other hand, take only a 
short period of family leave (if any) when becoming a father causing no human 
capital depreciation. The more children the woman has, the more time she will 
spend out of work causing even more human capital depreciation. During the 
childcare period women do not only suffer from skill atrophy but do not gain any 
new skills related to work.    
On the basis of the results, it is very likely that maternity and parental leave 
schemes are not only beneficial for those who use them (maintaining a good 
employer-employee match) but also harmful when used for a significantly long 
time (causing human capital depreciation). When these benefits are used mainly 
by the mothers the earning capacity of women is clearly negatively affected.    
If mothers would receive the same pay as other women the gender wage gap 
would narrow substantially. There are 40 000 working mothers on parental leave 
every year in Finland and because of the negative effect of leave on pay remains 
for years (though decreasing in time) it means enormous losses in the total wage 
sum of women and thus affects the overall gender wage gap. Thus, it would be 
beneficial both for mothers and employers if tools existed for avoiding human 
capital depreciation during the maternity leave. Moreover, if fathers took more 
parental leave, the career interruptions of mothers would not be that long causing 
less human capital depreciation for mothers.   
The obvious pitfall of this study lies in the estimation method. The Heckman 
selection model, and particularly the chosen identifying variable to estimate the 
model is outdated: being non-married is a poor predictor of being childless in the 
1990s Finland. The use and discovery of more appropriate estimation methods 
and idenfication strategies is left for future work.   
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